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THE POLITICS OF LEGAL DOCTRINE:
A CASE STUDY OF TEXAS LAND-USE
PLANNING UNDER THE SHADOW OF
LUCAS
David S. Caudill*
Win. Terry Bray**
Jack E. Owen, Jr.***
Doctrinal argument seems increasingly complex and ever less able
to determine outcomes....

The more diverse the sphere of an

argument's application, the thinner it seems to become until its
manipulability becomes more apparent than its persuasive clout.
The result has been ever more polarized arguments, ever more sophisticated doctrinal diversity, and ever more narrowly applicable
holdings.1
[The] pace of litigation in this already litigiousfield will quicken
as a result of the [Lucas] decision. Moreover, the non-deferential
test . . . may be nourished by the general confusion in this area

and grow without great regard for the presumed intent of the
Court that articulated it.'
On its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Lucas case re-invigorated the ever-present legal controversy over regulatory takings-when does a land-use regulation enacted to protect public
health, welfare and safety "go too far" and effect a compensable
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University; B.A., Michigan State
University; J.D., University of Houston; Ph.D., Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam. The authors
are grateful to Professors Louise Halper and Jeremy Paul for reading an earlier version of this
article, and to Steve Brody (J.D. cand., '94) for his research assistance.
** Shareholder, Graves, Dougherty, Hearon & Moody, P.C. (Austin, Texas); B.S.,
Mass. Inst. of Technology; J.D., University of Texas.
*** Partner, Osborne, Lowe, Helman & Smith, L.L.P. (Austin, Texas); B.S., U.S. Naval
Academy; J.D.; Harvard University.
1. David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism. and Contemporary Legal Scholarship, 21 NEw ENG. L. REv. 209, 211-212 (1986).
2. John R. Nolan, Footprints in the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A Practical
Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (1992).
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"taking"? 3 David Lucas' claim that South Carolina's Beachfront
Management Act (which prohibited home construction on his two
beachfront lots) constituted a compensable taking was successful in
the trial court, but the judgment was reversed by the South Carolina
Supreme Court.' In the months prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Lucas, the case came to symbolize a crossroads both in
terms of legal doctrine and of political debate. Doctrinally, planners
and land-use attorneys (representing developers or local governments) looked to the "new" Supreme Court for definitional guidance
concerning regulatory takings-for new principles or for selection
and rejection of existing, conflicting principles. More broadly, the
case reflected a national conflict of social visions-between those
who focus on environmental concerns and those who focus on property rights. The popular press thus characterized Lucas as a show5
down of sorts.
The Court reversed and remanded, giving Lucas the possibility
of keeping his judgment and, along the way, confirming that a regulation that causes loss of all economically viable use of a property is
a taking unless the regulation is clearly a nuisance abatement measure under state law. 6 Reaction to the Court's opinion was mixed.
Both "sides" were happy (property rights advocates saw the preservation of the regulatory takings doctrine; environmentalists saw narrow facts and a narrow holding), and unhappy (property rights advocates had hoped for more guidance in the form of principles
exceeding the narrow facts of the case; environmentalists were concerned with a potential chill on efforts to protect natural resources).7
In short, the Court came to the crossroads, and then stopped.
Meanwhile, in Austin, Texas, a controversy over a proposed
3. "While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Prior to
the Supreme Court's opinion in Lucas, Roger Findley observed that the case provided an opportunity for "substantial guidance" concerning this Mahon test, since "the definitions of
'property' and of what constitutes a 'taking' are elastic, and have been expanded and contracted by the... Court over the years." Roger Findley, Foreword: How Far Is Too Far? The
Constitutional Dimensions of Property, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1221 (1992).
4. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.Car. 1991).
5. See, e.g., David Kaplan et al., Pay Me or Get Off My Land, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9,
1992, at 70.
6. Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2895. On remand the restrictions imposed on Lucas were found
not to be justified under South Carolina's nuisance-abatement principles. See Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 1992 WL 358097 (S.C. Nov. 20, 1992).
7. See, e.g., William Flannery, Everybody Wins, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, July 13,
1992, at 16BP (summarizing happy and unhappy responses from both "conservatives" and
"environmentalists").
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water quality ordinance mirrored the national tension between environmental and property rights interests. As Lucas was generating
attention after certiorari was granted and again after oral arguments, support was growing in Austin for the "Save Our Springs"
("S.O.S.") ordinance, 8 which would be passed or defeated in a public vote on August 8, 1992. The ordinance was intended to place
severe limitations on development in southwest Austin in order to
protect water quality.9 C-n J1-'e 29, 1992, after the Court's opinion
in Lucas, opponents of the S.O.S. ordinance hoped that citizens
would be concerned about numerous takings claims and potentially
large judgments against the City; however, the ordinance was passed
by roughly a two-thirds majority."0 Throughout the "campaign" over
the S.O.S. ordinance, Lucas and the regulatory takings doctrine
were discussed, but in the end were either ignored, misunderstood, or
understood quite well and interpreted as irrelevant.
The purpose of this article is to explore the use of the regulatory
takings doctrine in political debate, with Austin's Summer of '92 as
our context. Several years ago, we-like so many others-wrote an
article about the doctrinal confusion in the field of regulatory takings, and we concluded that local politics was far more significant
than legal doctrine in land-use planning. 1 Specifically, we argued
that the perceptions of who has power (e.g., greedy developers over
poor municipalities, or scheming regulators over helpless landowners) were more determinative than the canon of judicial opinions
(and commentaries) in planning commission and city council decisions. When land-use restrictions are imposed by popular vote, the
argument becomes almost tautologous and local politics is determinative. In the Austin campaign, however, perhaps because of Lucas,
legal doctrine was at least a minor fixture alongside the predictable
production of images by supporters and opponents of the S.O.S. ordinance.2 Interestingly, to the extent that the popular image of land8. See Save Our Springs Initiative Petition, Aug. 8, 1992 ballot, Austin, Texas, attached as an appendix to this article [hereinafter Appendixl.
9. See Appendix. To prevent water pollution, the ordinance limits impervious cover and
requires runoff water quality controls to ensure no increase in 13 identified pollutants; certain
tracts and uses are then exempted from these restrictions.
10. See Bill Collier, S.O.S. initiative springs to landslide win, AUSTIN AMERICAN
STATESMAN, Aug. 9, 1992, at Al (64% of voters favored the ordinance).
11. See Wm.Terry Bray et al., Once More, the Trilogy, in Retrospect: An Essay on the
Virtues of Development Agreements in Texas, 32 S. TEx. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (1990); For a
similar analysis on which we relied in the above article, see Gregory J. Alexander, Takings,
Narratives, and Power, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (1988).
12. See Divisive battle over springs should be avoided, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,
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use planning controversies involves well-organized developers pitted
against weak environmental interests, 1 the Austin S.O.S. campaign
reversed that picture-supporters of the ordinance raised far more
money than the opposition and appeared to be better organized.
In Section I below, we describe the history and content of the
S.O.S. ordinance. Section II focuses on the use of legal doctrine in
Austin's political discourse prior to Lucas, and Section III focuses on
the five weeks of post-Lucas discourse before the vote on the S.O.S.
ordinance. Significantly, our discussion is limited to the doctrine of
regulatory takings under the United States Constitution, and we do
not discuss the questions that arose during the campaign concerning
the legality of the S.O.S. ordinance under other constitutional principles or under local and state law. 4 In Section IV, assuming that
controversies like Austin's will likely reappear, we argue that the use
of legal doctrine in Austin's recent political debate reveals the failure, identified by some legal scholars, of the current regulatory takings doctrine to serve as a guide to the limits on majoritarian control
over private property. While no "solution" to the conflict of social
visions or doctrinal confusion is readily apparent, we suggest that the
S.O.S. controversy highlights a need for change in the standards of
review in takings cases. Finally, we recommend that courts begin to
take more seriously some of the aphorisms that now clutter their takings opinions, so as to ensure more attention to the regulatory takings doctrine in local efforts to protect the environment.
While we find interesting the question of whether the initiative
process, which may not involve public hearings and systematic, administrative data-gathering, is appropriate for land-use regulation,
our analysis of the S.O.S. ordinance is not focused on the method of
its enactment. That is, although we describe in some detail the initiApril 8, 1992, at AI8 ("For instance, the leaders of the S.O.S. coalition have targeted two
developers who have been portrayed as the rascals whose greed will be the city's undoing. In
fact, Jim Bob Moffett and Gary Bradley together control less than 3 percent of the land at
stake [in the S.O.S. campaign]."). On the other hand, opponents of the S.O.S. initiative characterized the ordinance as having been drafted "behind closed doors without public hearings."
See What Do You Really Know About the S.O.S. Ordinance?, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 27, 1992, at AI0.
13. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.
J. 149, 160 (1971) (describing the organizational difficulties of environmentalists).
14. For example, the issues of whether the ordinance unlawfully regulates land use (and
not just water quality) outside Austin (in its extra-territorial jurisdiction); whether the ordinance conflicts with Texas Water Commission standards; whether the ordinance violates the
vested rights of permit holders by setting new expiration dates; and whether the ordinance
violates the City Charter, are beyond the scope of this study.
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ative process and campaign in Austin, our identification of certain
impoverished notions in takings jurisprudence, as well as our proposals for revitalizing those notions, are not limited to the field of regulations passed by popular vote. While the controversy in Austin highlights our concerns, the constitutional arguments that appeared in
the campaign, and our critique, would have been the same if the
Austin City Council passed the S.O.S. ordinance.
Undoubtedly, some will disagree with our assessment of the
S.O.S. initiative and the desirability of such ordinances. Even so, we
hope the following study will illustrate one of the ways in which doctrinal disagreements are played out in the local political process. The
Supreme Court's confidence that its land-use pronouncements
"lessen to some extent the freedom and flexibility of. . .governing
bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land use regulations" 1 5 is perhaps exaggerated whether such regulations are enacted
by City Councils or by popular vote.
I.

THE S.O.S. ORDINANCE

A divisive and bitter summer seems to be in the offing. The inevitability of that fight depends on how much each of the factions is
encouraged to at least talk with each other.16
A.

Genesis

In 1986, after months of controversy, the Austin City Council
passed its Comprehensive Watersheds Ordinance ("CWO") to control water quality in all of Austin's watersheds by restricting density
in various watershed categories (urban, suburban, etc.) and by establishing setback zones, e.g., no development within 50 feet of creeks
and streams, severely limited development in the next 100 to 300
feet, etc. 7 Five less extensive watershed protection ordinances had
been passed in the previous decade, but the CWO was viewed as a
substantial change in Austin's regulatory approach to new development. Opponents of the CWO claimed that a hidden "slow growth"
agenda, not water quality, was driving the new approach, and undeniably the previously quiet state capital and university "town" had
been in a fast-growth mode in the late 1970's and early 1980's.
15. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
321 (1987).
16. Divisive battle over springs should be avoided, supra note 12, at A18.
17. AUSTIN, Tx., CITY CODE ch. 13-15, art. 11 (1981).
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The CWO was revised and amended several times during the
next few years, but it was not until 1990 that another major watershed controversy arose, this one caused by a proposal to develop
4000 acres in the so-called Barton Creek watershed (a major watershed in the southwest Austin area). On June 7, 1990, more than 800
people, most opposed to the project, signed up "to address the City
Council during an all-night marathon meeting." 18 That fall (1990),
the city planning staff was directed by the Council to draft a new
ordinance to prevent any degradation of the Barton Creek watershed, and a temporary moratorium on development was passed.
Hearings continued throughout 1991 on the new ordinance, which
was to become part of the CWO and was "expanded" to include
restrictions on all watersheds contributing to Barton Springs1" (an
area of approximately 150 square-miles). In the fall of 1991, the
recently-formed Save Our Springs Coalition appeared before the
Council and proposed several strict amendments to the CWO. The
compromise version of these amendments adopted in October was
viewed generally as too strong by the business community and too
weak for the Coalition and other environmentalists.2 0
Within weeks, the S.O.S. Coalition began collecting signatures
to force a citywide vote on its own water quality initiative, and on
March 13, 1992, the Coalition filed 26,835 signatures (more than 10
percent of the registered voters) with the city clerk. Following a brief
dispute over when the S.O.S. initiative would be on the ballot, (May
or August), the City Council approved addition of the initiative to an
August 8 ballot. By May, an alternative ordinance-generally supported by the business community-was also approved as an addition to the ballot. This alternative ordinance called for reliance upon
the existing CWO but also required development of a comprehensive
water quality protection plan for the entire Barton Creek watershed
in cooperation with state authorities. 1
18. See Debate on springs' water quality has a long history, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESJune 25, 1992, at AI0.
19. Barton Springs (the "Springs") refers to the large, natural spring-fed swimming facility in one of Austin's downtown parks. The evocative power of the image of Barton Springs
to Austin residents should not be underestimated. "The springs were enjoyed by Native Americans for thousands of years before the arrival of Europeans. According to Native American
legend, the Great Spirit created the springs by hurling a rainbow against the limestone of the
Edwards Aquifer, splitting the rock so that the cool, clear water could flow forth." Collier,
supra note 10, at A19.
20. Debate on springs' water quality has a long history, supra note 18, at AI0.
21. Id. The "alternative" ordinance, not discussed in this article, reflected deference to
the Texas Water Commission and its authority to set water quality standards.
MAN,
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Some of the debate that followed approval of the ballot additions took place before the City Council, as the Council had authority to pass the S.O.S. ordinance (or the alternative ordinance) prior
to the election. Proponents of the S.O.S. initiative criticized existing
regulations and the alternative ordinance as inadequate to protect
environmentally sensitive areas of the city, primarily because of
waiver and exemption provisions. Opponents of S.O.S. warned of tax
revenue losses resulting in loss of government services, loss of jobs
(particularly because of the potential effect on the local construction
industry, but also because companies would be unlikely to expand or
to locate in Austin), and economic segregation due to increased cost
of housing. 2 Outside the council chambers, the Austin AmericanStatesman, Austin's major newspaper, covered the controversy almost daily, interviewing city leaders, owners of undeveloped tracts,
and those directly involved in the interest groups and organizations
favoring or opposing the ordinance. One member of the S.O.S. Coalition Steering Committee remarked that the ordinance was simply
designed to "keep Austin from becoming another Houston or Dallas
or some other city that's lost its quality of life .... People think this
is a no-growth agenda, but that's not the case. We just want to preserve some of the Hill Country that makes this place so special." 2 3
In opposition to the S.O.S. initiative, a .group called "Citizens for
Responsible Planning," endorsed by realtors, builders, and the
Chamber of Commerce, was formed to convince voters that S.O.S.
was a "no-growth", and not really a water quality, ordinance." By
mid-July, the opposing sides in the campaign had raised about
$460,000, but the S.O.S. Coalition "out-raised" the Citizens for Responsible Planning by a ratio of almost 3-to-1.2
Though comparisons are difficult, proponents of the S.O.S. ordinance pointed out that other communities have adopted strict limits
on development to protect water quality-some stricter than the
S.O.S. limits-and that takings lawsuits in some of those communities were unsuccessful. 6 An article in the Austin American-States22.

Mike Todd, S.O.S. initiative stirs debate at hearing, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATES-

MAN, April 21, 1992, at B1.

23.

Bill Collier, Environment battle being fought on many fronts,

AUSTIN AMERICAN-

STATESMAN, June 25, 1992, at A12 (quoting Helen Ballew).

24.

See What Do You Really Know About the S.O.S. Ordinance?, supra note 12, at

25.

Bob Burns, $460,000 flows to campaigns in water debate, AUSTIN AMERICANJuly 11, 1992, at Al.
John McAllen Scanlan, Other cities test waters with ordinances, AUSTIN AMERICAN-

A10.
STATESMAN,

26.
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man noted that Boulder, Colorado, and Raleigh, North Carolina,
have thrived under slow-growth laws, thus challenging claims by
S.O.S. opponents that Austin would suffer economically under the
S.O.S. ordinance. 7
Two well-attended conferences were held at the LBJ School of
Public Affairs (University of Texas at Austin), one entitled "Watershed Management: A Regional Approach to Improving Water Quality" and one entitled "Austin's Environment and its Economy: Can
They Prosper in Harmony?" Both were intended to educate the voters on the August 8 ballot issues, but the latter was a special attempt
to encourage cooperation between the two "sides" in the campaign.
However, no significant cooperation was evident, and as the polls began to indicate that a majority of the voters favored the S.O.S. ordinance, landowners who would be most affected by the ordinance began to consider the courts as their only recourse against what they
viewed as a confiscatory regulation.
In the weeks immediately following the vote on the S.O.S. initiative, only one lawsuit was filed against the city challenging the
S.O.S. ordinance, and an appeal of the ordinance's validity was filed
with the Texas Water Commission. However, one City Council
member said he expected numerous suits, and the mayor said that
the Council was "committed now to making a vigorous defense" of
the new law.1 8 Many landowners who would have been affected by
the ordinance filed preliminary proposals for development that were
approved prior to the election, thus avoiding. compliance with the
S.O.S. restrictions.
B.

Content

Every landowner will be able to build something under our ordinance. What we've simply done is prohibit high-intensity urban development, galleria-style shopping centers, [and] massive apartment complexes [that] .

.

. will simply destroy water quality for

our creeks, aquifer and springs. 9
July 9, 1992, at A-17 (referring to towns in New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
New York, Delaware, Washington, Missouri, South Dakota, Virginia, and North Carolina).
27. Michael Totty, Cities: Slow-growth laws helped us grow and Raleigh's rules drive
intense development from water supplies, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 5, 1992, at Dl.
28. Mike Todd, City braces for battle over S.O.S., AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, August 11, 1992, at BI.
29. Bill Bunch et al., Press Conference: A legal briefing on S.O.S. 5 (Mar. 3, 1992)
(transcript on file with authors and Hofstra Property Law Journal) [hereinafter Conference].
STATESMAN,
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The first section of the S.O.S. ordinance is a four-part declaration of intent: to preserve water quality, to prevent further degradation of water quality, to provide for consistent administration of the
city's watershed ordinances, and to promote the public health, safety
and welfare.3 0 The second section places two restrictions on new development: (a) impervious cover" is limited to a maximum of 25%
(or 20% within the Barton Creek watershed contributing zone, or
15% within the "recharge" zone3"), but the maximum can be reduced if necessary to prevent pollution; and (b) runof3 a must be
managed to ensure no increase in thirteen identified pollutants.34 No
exemptions, waivers, or variances are permitted, but the restrictions
do not apply to existing (platted) lots or tracts if new development
involves (a) construction or renovation of one single family or duplex
structure, (b) a maximum of 8000 square feet of impervious cover
(impliedly small commercial development), or (c) school construction.3 Previously approved subdivision or site plans will expire under
the ordinance unless construction commences within 1-3 years, depending on the date of initial approval.3 Finally, the ordinance includes a limited adjustment provision which allows modification of
the ordinance as to a specific tract following a court's final judgment
or a City Council decision that the ordinance conflicts with state or
37
federal law.
Critics of the ordinance questioned the need for both impervious
cover restrictions and a prohibition against increase in pollutant
loads; that is, if no degradation of water quality is caused by new
development, then the only reason for impervious cover limitations is
to target (and prohibit) large developments, encouraging slow
growth. Critics also questioned the engineering assumptions behind
30. See Appendix at Part 1.
31. Impervious cover is "the total horizontal area of all buildings, roofed or covered
spaces, paved surfaced areas, walkways, and driveways. Pools, including but not limited to
swimming pools, reflecting ponds, and fountains, are not included in calculating impervious
coverage." Austin, Tex., City Code, title XIII, § 13-2-1 (1981).
32. The "recharge" zone is, generally, the land over an aquifer that serves to transmit a
significant amount of surface water into the subsurface strata of the aquifer. For a definition of
an aquifer, see infra note 88.
33. Runoff is "that part of the precipitation which reaches a stream, drain, or sewer."
CITY OF AUSTIN DRAINAGE CRITERIA MANUAL G-6 (1988). Precipitation is defined as "any
moisture that falls from the atmosphere, including snow, sleet, rain and hail." Id. at G-5.
34. See Appendix at Part 2.
35. Id. at Parts 3-4.
36. Id. at Part 5.
37. Id. at Part 6.
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the ordinance, namely the designation of 25 % (or less) impervious
cover as the point beyond which development seriously affects water
quality.38 Proponents, however, suggested design creativity for future
development (e.g., cluster homes surrounded by open land, or tall
parking structures), and relied on engineering studies indicating that
"it's essentially impossible to maintain high water quality when your
impervious cover goes much above 15%."31 Throughout the campaign, engineering data was presented by one side and discredited by
the other to the extent that the influence of environmental science on
the election was likely minimal.4 °
In the remainder of this article, we focus on the claim made by
opponents of the S.O.S. initiative that the ordinance may, as to
properties severely affected, constitute a large number of takings
without compensation.

II. PRE-LUCAS

TAKINGS DOCTRINE IN THE S.O.S. CONTROVERSY

"[The S.O.S. initiative] has a life of its own," said George Avery
of the Austin group of the Sierra Club. "It's anti-growth, antidevelopment, anti-wealth, anti-politics.It's not just a coalition of
environmentalists. It's a train."'41

A.

Background

1. Penn Central
In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld New York City's
landmark preservation law, which prohibited construction of a proposed office tower, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York. 2 After first noting that regulatory takings questions are
See C. White, S.O.S.-about water quality, or political control?, THE WESTBANK
June 17, 1992, at 32 ("Rick Coneway, [an outspoken opponent of the S.O.S. initiative and] an environmental engineer ... agrees that the engineering for the S.O.S. is flawed.").
39. Conference, supra note 29, at 18.
40. See Bill Collier, Study: Water quality at Barton Springs has not deteriorated, Aus38.

PICAYUNE,

June 23, 1992, at BI.
A new study by an Austin water-quality consulting firm concludes there is no evidence that the quality of water in Barton Springs has deteriorated ....
But the
study ... was quickly disputed-by environmentalists who contend the springs have
been degraded and will get worse unless voters approve the [S.O.S.] ordinance on
Aug. 8.

TIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN,

Id.
Bill Collier, New Faces bring new tactics to old war over springs, AUSTIN
May 24, 1992, at AI5.
42. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
41.

CAN-STATESMAN,

AMERI-
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case-by-case, "ad hoc, factual inquiries," the Court identified several
factors that have "particular significance" in such analyses.4 3 The
degree-of "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant" (particularly, the "extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"), and whether "the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government," are primary considerations when a landowner claims
that a compensable taking has occurred."' On the other hand, mere
"diminution in property value, standing alone," cannot establish a
compensable taking.4 5 Moreover, considerations of public "health,
safety, morals, or general welfare" are sometimes sufficient to uphold
"land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized
46
real property interests.1
Penn Central therefore provides a comparative, balancing test
for determining when a particular land use regulation constitutes a
compensable taking. A regulation can constitute a taking if it is "not
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose" or if it has "an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of
the property. '47 A regulation will not effect a taking if it is "substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare" and permits
an owner "reasonable beneficial use" 48 of property "for its intended
purposes and in a gainful fashion. 4 9 In Agins v. City of Tiburon, °
the Court continued to develop this standard for review of land use
regulations. Regulations effect a taking if they do not "substantially
advance legitimate state interests . . . or [if they deny] an owner
economically viable use of his land." 5' 1 The Court reaffirmed that
regulatory takings questions necessarily require a "weighing of private and public interests. 5 2
Even for those who are not overly cynical, the problems with the
foregoing "doctrine" are obvious-how do we measure "economic
impact"?; what is a "distinct" investment-backed expectation?;
when can a regulation be characterized as a physical invasion?;
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 124.
Id.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 138 n.36.
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
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which public needs justify "destruction" of property interests?; when
is an impact "unduly harsh"?; what is "reasonable" beneficial use?;
when is an interest "substantially" advanced?; and so on. The professed establishment of weighty factors and significant considerations
barely hides the absence of reliable guidelines. Richard Epstein, author of Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, and Jeremy Paul, 53 one of his harshest critics, recognized in
the early 1980's that the Court was unable "to find principled ways
to sanction government action."" Even if one appreciates the
Court's honesty in acknowledging its "ad hoc" approach 5 5 everybody seems to recognize that almost any land-use regulation can be
characterized as a taking or not based on some combination and interpretation of the factors to be considered. 56 The history of judicial
deference to land-use regulators and reluctance to find a taking can
be understood as doctrinal consistency, but might also be attributed
to doctrinal confusion. By the late 1980's, the Court was willing to
acknowledge and address the perceived chaos in the field of regulatory takings.5 7
2.

The Trilogy

In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decided three major land use
cases: Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,1"
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,59 and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.6" Each of these
opinions included an attempt to clarify the way land use regulation
questions will be decided under the Fifth Amendment. Keystone re53. See Jeremy Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 743 (1986)
(book review).
54. Id. at 775.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 744 (Epstein "illuminates flaws in contemporary judicial reasoning"); id.
at 775-780 (discussion of open-ended nature of the various factors to be considered in a takings analysis).
57. In 1977, Bruce Ackerman observed the confused judicial responses to the compensation clause and the "pervasive judicial recognition" that the field "is in need of a fundamental
reconsideration." Bruce A. Ackerman, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1977).
In 1986, Berger and Kanner found no "reliable legal doctrine of sufficient substance to guide
landowners and governmental entities in their dealings with each other." Michael M. Berger
& Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang
of Five's" Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 Loy. L.A. L.
REV.

685, 695 (1986).
58.

480 U.S. 470 (1987).

59. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
60. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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fined the Penn Central standard of review, suggesting that a regula-

tion aimed at the abatement of an illegal or injurious use-a public
nuisance-does not constitute a compensable taking. 61 First English
fashioned a new takings remedy for landowners, holding that even a
temporary taking, specifically a temporary loss of all use of the land,
could warrant government compensation. 2 In the area of impact
fees, exactions, and other conditions on land development imposed by
governmental authorities, Nollan also altered the Penn Central standard of review by demanding demonstration of an "essential nexus"
between an exaction imposed on the landowner and the legitimate
state interest to be furthered by that exaction. 63
61. 480 U.S. at 491. In Keystone, the Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and
Land Conservation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 52 secs. 1406.1 - 1406.21 (1966 & Supp. 1991)
(prohibiting mining that causes subsidence damage to existing buildings, dwellings, and cemeteries), was challenged by the plaintiff as a taking without compensation. Relying on the Penn
Central test, as restated in Agins, the Court found no compensable taking had occurred. 480
U.S. at 485. The Court had little difficulty satisfying the first prong of the test, finding that
there was a substantial and legitimate public interest in preventing subsidence damage, which
is akin to a nuisance, and that the Subsidence Act appeared to be effective in serving that
interest. Id. As to the second prong, denial of economically viable use, the Court held that the
Subsidence Act did not make "it impossible for petitioners to profitably engage in their business." Id. (emphasis added). Specifically, there was no claim by petitioners that the Subsiin
dence Act "makes it commercially impracticablefor them to continue mining ... coal ..
western Pennsylvania." Id. at 495-96 (emphasis added).
62. 482 U.S. at 318. In First English, the plaintiff challenged as a regulatory taking (or
"inverse condemnation") an interim flood protection area ordinance which purportedly prohibited all use of plaintiffs land located within the flood protection area. Id. at 308. The Court,
without deciding whether a taking had occurred, held that "where the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective." Id. at 321.
63. 483 U.S. at 837. In Nollan, the California Coastal Commission required a public
access easement across plaintiffs' beachfront property as a condition to granting a permit to
rebuild on that property. Id. at 828. Relying on the Penn Central test, a's restated in Agins, the
Court found a compensable taking had occurred. Id. at 832. The Court focused on the requirements of the first prong of the test, which provides that a land use regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state interest to avoid characterization as a compensable taking. Id.
at 834. Even assuming a legitimate state interest in providing public view of the beach, the
Court failed to find an "essential nexus" between the public access easement condition imposed on the building permit and the state interest. Id. at 837. Although Nollan confirms the
validity of many of the conditions on land development imposed by governmental authorities,
the heightened scrutiny of development restrictions after Nollan could curb overly-aggressive
development requirements. Moreover, since Nollan's "essential nexus" requirement (part of
Penn Centrars first prong test) can be interpreted as broadly applicable to all takings questions (and not just to permit conditions), Nollan could represent a significant limitation on the
power of regulators over property owners.
After the 1987 Trilogy decisions, the Court in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988), held that a challenge to a San Jose, California, rent control ordinance was "premature," noting there was no evidence that the tenant hardship clause had ever been applied to
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Any unbounded optimism following Keystone on the part of
proponents of aggressive environmental regulation was likely mediated by the remainder of the Trilogy. While those concerned with
property rights generally were quite hopeful following First English
and Nollan," many remained concerned that the Trilogy left takings
jurisprudence in flux. The three opinions, each of which included a
takings analysis, reveal differences in emphasis and terminology,
and, of course, the facts in each case are unique. Some scholars believed that the quest for a comprehensible takings doctrine was in
worse shape than ever after the Trilogy. 5 For example, Nollan's
"nexus" requirement, seemingly a barrier to regulators, may be easily met by better articulation of the purpose of an ordinance. 66 The
various factors from Penn Central remained, after the Trilogy, with' 67
out "precise content or substantive bite.
Nevertheless, numerous legal scholars believed that the Trilogy,
in combination with earlier cases, constituted a consistent and defensible analytical scheme. For example, one commentator" argued
that the Trilogy cases are theoretically, if not facially, consistent:
"When considering all three of the challenged regulations, the
reduce a tenant's rent, and that reduction of rent on the grounds of tenant hardship was not
mandatory under the ordinance. Id. at 9-10. In his dissent, Justice Scalia, the author of Nollan, joined by Justice O'Connor, found it incomprehensible that appellant's claim could be
avoided as "premature." Id. at 15-16. He remarked that "it is surprising that we have so soon
forgotten" the Keystone holding which permitted a similar facial challenge to a statute. Id. at
16. Clearly concerned that the Court was backsliding on the Nollan "essential nexus" requirement, Justice Scalia also questioned whether the tenant hardship clause of the San Jose rent
control ordinance substantially advanced a legitimate state interest. Id. at 18. He concluded,
"the neediness of renters . . . is not remotely attributable to the particular landlords that the
[o]rdinance singles out.
... Id. at 21 (alteration in original). In other words, because there
was no cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted (the amount of economic return to owner), and the social evil that the regulation sought to remedy (the existence
of some renters who are too poor to afford even reasonably priced housing), Justice Scalia
would have found that the ordinance effected a taking of property without just compensation.
Id. at 24.
64. See, e.g., Fred Strasser & Maroia Coyle, Powell's Resignation Wasn't the Only
Bombshell, NAT'L. L.J., July 20, 1987, at 5 (First English "effectively clipp[ed] the wings" of
local regulatory officials); William Fulton, Zoning Decision Still Leaves Room for City Regulation, L.A. DAILY J., June 29, 1987 (Nollan as a "Sword of Damocles [hanging] over the
heads of all local zoning authorities").
65. See Win. Terry Bray et al., supra note 10, at 20-23 (discussing the assessments of
the Trilogy by John Martinez, Richard Wilkins, Robert Asher, and others).
66. Id. at 21 (citing Richard Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plotfor an Old
Constitutional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1989)).
67. Wilkins, supra note 66, at 45.
68. Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Note, A Blow for Land-Use Planning?-The Takings Issue Reexamined, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107 (1989).
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strength of the public purpose and its direct relationship to the terms
of the regulation remain strong considerations in favor of validity...
. The Court's concern with a valid purpose regulated through appropriate means is clear throughout each opinion." 9 Michael Simon observed that the Trilogy "clarifies some of the questions and provides
a more solid framework that state courts can use to analyze takings
claims."7 Michael Berger, who represented the property owner in
First English, also believed that the Trilogy answered many questions, and established numerous ground rules." Some of the new
rules identified by Berger include the following: (1) valid regulation
may require compensation if private property is taken in the process;
(2) all takings, permanent or temporary, require compensation; (3)
property owners have a right to build subject only to reasonable regulation; (4) dedication to the government as a condition to obtaining
a development permit is not a voluntary act by the owner; and (5)
exactions require the Nollan nexus. 7 2 Richard Epstein, convinced
that Keystone could be read as a dangerous expansion of state
power, 73 thought courts would find coherent principles in First English and Nollan.7 " Epstein is famous for his concern that the police
power concept has an unfortunate tendency to swallow up the concept of private property, especially as the traditional safety-healthwelfare litany of police power gives way "to a more pallid formulation which rejects challenges to a zoning ordinance, for example,
when it can be shown that the ordinance 'bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest,' which, given the looseness of the
language, it almost always does."'75 For Epstein, the "police power
69. Id. at 1122-23.
70. Michael Simon, The Supreme Court's 1987 "Takings" Triad: An Old Hat in a New
Box or a Revolution in Takings Law?, 1 U. FLA. JL. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 132 (1987). Of
course, the Court "did not completely clarify this area of the law"; the Trilogy provides "small
but significant insights into the direction of future land use decisions." Id. at 131.
71. Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes
New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URa. LAW. 735, 743 (1988).
72. See id. at 744-48.
73. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 4
(1987). According to Epstein, following Keystone "there was really no place to go but up" in
First English and Nollan. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 44.
75. Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain,
at 108-09 (1985) (quoting Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 906 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976)). A recent version of this argument is found in the
dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Keystone:
A broad exception [for nuisance regulations] to the operation of the Just Compensation Clause based on the exercise of multifaceted health, welfare, and safety regula-
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cannot be interpreted as an unrestricted grant of state power to act
in the public interest, for then the exception will overwhelm the [takings] clause."7 6
Between 1988 and 1991, the Trilogy (or one or two of the Trilogy cases) was cited in hundreds of state and federal cases. 77 Sometimes the reference was not to dispositional authority, but merely a
bibliographical aid to further reading. Much of the time, however,
the Trilogy appeared to provide doctrinal guidance. First English,
for example, seemed to be particularly helpful to courts in defining
excessive regulation and various remedies; 78 Nollan's "nexus" requirement was popular; 79 and Keystone was useful in nuisance
cases. 80 A return to the S.O.S. controversy, however, reveals that
contemporary takings law can justify contradictory interpretations of
the constitutionality of an ordinance.
B.

Interpretations

To put it into perspective, turn to a landowner [like Ira Yates
who] owns some 72 acres. . . . If the S.O.S. passes, Yates said,
85 percent of his land becomes immediately useless because of the
impervious cover requirements.
Yates says OK, if I can't use it, pay me for it. But payment for
land is not part of S.O.S.81

tions would surely allow government much greater authority than we have recognized to impose societal burdens on individual landowners, for nearly every action
the government takes is intended to secure for the public an extra measure of
"health, safety and welfare."
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1256-57 (1987) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76.

Epstein, supra note 73, at 109.

77.

This estimate is based on a WESTLAW computer search conducted in early 1992.

78. See, e.g., Smith v. City of San Francisco, 225 Cal. App. 3d 38, 45, 275 Cal. Rptr.
17, 21 (1990); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 757, 764, 583 N.E.2d 894
(1992).
79. See, e.g., Surfside Colony, Ltd. v. California Coastal Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 3d
1260, 1267, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 377-378 (1990) (Nollan requires a "substantial" connection
between burden imposed by project and condition imposed by government); Cobb v. Snohomish, 64 Wash. App. 451, 829 P.2d 169, 178 (1992).
80. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
210 Cal. App. 3d 1421, 1444 n. 10, 259 Cal. Rptr. 132, 148 n. 10 (1989); Birnbaum v. State,
73 N.Y.2d 638, 541 N.E.2d 23, 543 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1989).
81.

White, supra note 38, at 15.
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1. A Litigation Nightmare, or "The 1992 Attorneys' Relief
Act"
Attorneys in Austin opposed to the S.O.S. initiative were quick
to point out that the ordinance, if passed, would invite takings
claims. The Austin American-Statesman, in an effort to educate the
voters, ran a regular "S.O.S. question and answer" column during
the campaign. On June 20, the question was "Would the [S.O.S.]
ordinance, if adopted, make the city more vulnerable to litigation?"
The S.O.S. coalition representative consulted by the newspaper answered that the ordinance contains an adjustment provision to ensure
its legality (Part 6 of the ordinance) 8 2; but City Council Member
Bob Larson replied, "[w]e've had three separate sets of attorneys
[hired by the City] who have told us we're going to get our pants
sued off if this thing passes."' 83 Several features of the ordinance support the view that substantial litigation, or at least an "adjustment"
process that looks like litigation, is likely.
The question of whether the S.O.S. ordinance will be challenged
is, of course, different from the question of whether any such challenges will be successful. Proponents of the ordinance were genuinely
confident that no such challenges would be successful, 84 that no "serious" attorney would view the ordinance as unconstitutional,8 5 and
that while lawsuits may be filed, the motivation would be harassment
rather than a hope of victory. 86 Given the current state of regulatory
takings doctrine, we express no confidence as to the outcome of such
challenges. Rather, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate that
the S.O.S. ordinance is arguably suspect under current doctrine.
For example, the Declaration of Intent (Part 1) of the S.O.S.
ordinance contains three specific objectives-to preserve a clean and
safe drinking water supply, 87 to prevent further degradation of Barton Creek, Barton Springs, and the Barton Springs Edwards Aquifer, 8 and to provide for fair and consistent administration of existing
82. See Appendix.
83. S.O.S. Question and Answer, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 20, 1992, at B7.
84. See infra sections II.B.2., III.B.
85. Conference, supra note 29, at 12. Jim Frederick said that "this thing isn't open to
attack by serious legal people." Id.
86. Id. at 22. Brigid Shea stated that one developer with "unlimited resources ... has
made clear his willingness to use . . .lawsuits to try and punish the City." Id.
87. See Appendix at Part 1.
88. Id. An aquifer is "[ain underground bed or layer of earth, gravel, or porous stone
that yields water." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 92
(3d. ed. 1992).
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watershed protection ordinances.8 9 While there can be little doubt
that these intentions are laudable, one might reasonably ask, in view
of Nollan, whether there are unstated intentions or goals behind the
express Declaration, e.g., to slow growth. Next, one might ask
whether the land use restrictions in the ordinance will effectively
serve the stated intentions. The mere recital that a fourth intention
of the ordinance is to "promote the public health, safety, and welfare" should not, by itself, satisfy the requirement in Nollan that a
regulatory burden placed on a landowner be substantially related to
the burden which the proposed use places on the public. In other
words, is there an "essential nexus" between the otherwise valid purpose of the ordinance and the burdens placed on landowners?
Beyond the questions of whether the ordinance has a valid purpose or appropriately serves its purpose, even a valid regulation can
effect a taking. If the S.O.S. ordinance, upon consideration of its
economic impact and the investment-backed expectations of landowners, causes some persons to lose all "economically viable use" of
their land, the City of Austin will be required either to "adjust" the
ordinance or to compensate the owners for such losses. While Keystone suggested that compensation is not required when a public nuisance is identified and the particular injurious use is prohibited, not
every exercise of police power is directed toward nuisances.9 0 If the
notion of nuisance-abatement is used to characterize land use regulation generally, the takings doctrine would be rendered obsolete. In
any event, the S.O.S. ordinance is arguably more than a nuisance
abatement regulation-the limitations on impervious cover, for example, would apply to an undeveloped tract even if a more intense
use of the tract could be shown to meet the water quality standards
in the ordinance.
In view of the potential for claims that the S.O.S. ordinance
effects a taking with respect to a particular tract of land, Part 6 of
the ordinance includes an adjustment provision to meet the requirements of existing law. The provision allows for adjustment following
89. See Appendix at Part 1.
90. 480 U.S. at 488-493. "Thus, the Court seems by implication to sort the class of
regulatory public purposes into two subclasses. One subclass includes . . . preventing nuisancelike uses. . . . The other subclass contains regulations . . . securing . . . other public benefits. . . . [The Court is] divided sharply about where to draw the line between the two." Frank
Michelman, Takings 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1603 (1988) (footnotes omitted). Ambiguity remained as to whether a nuisance-abatement regulation is never a taking or is not a
taking if it passes the other takings tests. Id. at 1604 n.19. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.

1992]

THE POLITICS OF LEGAL DOCTRINE

a court's final judgment, but also following a three-quarters majority
vote by the City Council after a public hearing. The intention of this
provision, with respect to the availability of a hearing before the City
Council, is obviously to provide a "safety valve" against litigation.
However, landowners challenging the ordinance will be required
under current proposals for processing adjustment claims to submit a
legal brief prior to the hearing. Even those who do petition the City
Council are not precluded from filing a lawsuit if the ordinance is
not adjusted in their favor. Moreover, any adjustments in favor of
landowners will likely lead to more petitions, briefs and hearings,
and each hearing will look a lot like takings litigation.
We consider below several distinct takings challenges which
could be raised against the S.O.S. ordinance. Significantly, the effects of the ordinance will vary among landowners. Nevertheless,
those who are adversely affected will have several doctrinal bases to
support their takings claims.
a.

Purpose

While the stated purpose of water quality protection appears
uncontroversial, the purpose of the S.O.S ordinance becomes an issue to the extent that the terms of the ordinance do not substantially
advance that purpose. For example, the impervious cover limitations
in the S.O.S. ordinance (15-25%) are coupled with a requirement
that landowners control runoff to ensure no increase in the average
annual loadings of specified pollutants. 91 This formulation of pollution prevention calls into question the impervious cover limitations,
since it is difficult to imagine how the existence of 26 % impervious
cover with no increase in pollutant load fails to serve the goal of
water quality, while limiting impervious cover to 25% of a tract
somehow furthers that goal. Given such dissonance between the purpose of the ordinance and the regulation itself, the purpose of the
ordinance may have been "converted", in terms of Nollan, into another purpose, namely the taking of property without compensation.
Of course, one may speculate the impervious cover requirements are
not intended, specifically, to prevent pollutant loading but are intended, generally, to make water quality protection easier. One
might also, however, speculate that supporters of the ordinance are
more interested in slowing growth than in water quality, and to the
extent that a landowner or a class of landowners can show that the
91.

See Appendix at Part 2(a).
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pollution control standards in the ordinance are impossible to meet,
then the ordinance does not really allow new development at all regardless of the amount of permissible impervious cover.92
One could also reasonably argue that supporters of the S.O.S.
ordinance lack confidence in the City's ability to enforce water quality controls, thus an unreasonable regulatory scheme was contrived
to stop development because of the fear that a reasonable scheme
will not work." If the purpose is actually government reform, then
the S.O.S. ordinance lacks a legitimate purpose in the context of
land use planning. But even assuming that the original purpose-pollution prevention-is legitimate, the purpose becomes illegitimate when the terms of the ordinance do not substantially advance the original purpose.
b.

Nexus

The S.O.S. ordinance could also be challenged for the lack of an
"essential nexus" between the goals of the ordinance and its provisions. This argument differs slightly from the above challenge that
the stated purpose of the ordinance is not advanced by its terms.
Here, the focus is shifted from conversion of the stated purpose to an
illegitimate purpose (e.g., pollution prevention is legitimate, while an
92. Tom Schueler, a water quality expert, said it was not possible for water quality
devices to filter 100% of pollutants after property is developed. See Kim Tyson, Water quality
factions argue impact of S.O.S., AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 5, 1992, at A12.
"Neither Brigid Shea, director of the Save Our Springs Coalition, nor [Coalition attorney]
Bunch could provide an example of how a property could be developed and still meet the
proposed S.O.S. ordinance." Id. Austan Librach, director of Austin's Environmental and Conservation Services Department, said that "annual average loadings statistics do not exist for
many of the parameters listed [in the S.O.S. ordinance] and no methodology for establishing
these loads is offered." Bob Burns, If it Passes, Implementing S.O.S. Initiative Could Take
Months - Even Years, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, August 2, 1992, at All. Other engineers said that even if the data was available, "it would still be impossible to develop land
because many of the 13 pollutants aren't found on raw land, which means [a developer] would
have to design devices to remove 100 percent of the pollutants. That, they say is technologically impossible." Id.
93. In a press conference, Coalition attorney Jim Couser asked,
Can the city ... say . . . we really think only 20% impervious cover is safe, but, if
you will promise that you would not [permit] dangerous levels of runoff from your
property we are going to let you have 50 or 60[?] [The] problem ... is that for the
city that is not an enforceable promise ....
Because, where the city is fairly good at
permitting, frankly the city is lousy at policing activities that have already been
permitted. And that is a practical problem and a legal problem.
See supra note 29, at 20. A television commercial in July sponsored by the S.O.S. Coalition
featured the voice of a businessman, Lee Walker, saying "It's a simple question. Who are you
going to trust to protect the creek, the [city] council or the SOS ordinance?" S.O.S., Business
Group Unveil Television Ads, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, July 14, 1992, at B2.
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intention to take without compensation is illegitimate) to a direct
analysis of how successful the ordinance is in advancing the purpose,
assuming it is legitimate.
The first "part" of the Penn Central and Agins analyses-that a
land use regulation must substantially advance a legitimate state interest 4-seemed to gain a new significance in Nollan's "rational
nexus" requirement:
[In] our verbal formulations in the takings field . . . [we] have
required that the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved .... not that "the State
'could rationally have decided' that the measure adopted might
achieve the State's objective.""
Some have identified in such statements a shift in the presumption of constitutionality of land use regulations. 6 At the very least,
Nollan raises questions about the Texas cases that emphasize the
"extraordinary burden" on one challenging the rational relationship
of a land-use ordinance to a legitimate state interest, 7 and that if
reasonable minds can differ on the necessary relationship, the ordinance will be sustained.98 Such standards may represent a tradition
of presumption against judicial intervention that has been eroded by
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases. That is, "the recent 'federalization' of land-use law has given state courts a variety of new doctrines
to justify more intense scrutiny." 99 The shift toward greater judicial
scrutiny of the "presumed" nexus between the terms of a regulation
and a legitimate state interest is perhaps a recognition that the pace
of land use regulation has increased to the point where one can no
longer assume that every ordinance passed is reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest.
Limitations on development, in the form of impervious cover restrictions, if isolated from all other factors, obviously bear some rela94. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 (citations omitted).
96. See, e.g., Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of
Constitutionality in Land-Use Law, 24 URn. LAW. 1 (1992); see also Bruce W. Burton, Predatory Municipal Zoning Practices: Challenging the Presumption of Constitutionality in the
Wake of the "Takings Trilogy", 44 ARK. L. REv. 65 (1991); but see Frank Michelman, Takings 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1605-14 (1988), for a qualified reading of Nollan's
heightened-scrutiny message.
97. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1984).
98. City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1087 (1982).
99. Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 96, at 3.
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tionship to water quality-no development is one way of preventing
pollutants, and unrestricted development, with no water quality controls, will likely produce pollutants. Similarly, an ordinance that requires control of runoff to protect water quality is valid as long as
the required controls substantially advance water quality. The S.O.S.
ordinance, however, combines standards for runoff with impervious
cover limitations, thereby arguably losing any essential nexus between both those restrictions and the goal of water quality. In the
face of such a challenge, the City of Austin could argue that the
double-restriction ensures water quality because one control mechanism may break down. Such an argument appears to be an admission that the drafters of the ordinance could not decide which restriction was rational, but the City would surely argue that a certain
level of redundance is justified for a goal as important as water quality protection.
Given the perceived shift in constitutional presumptions, the
S.O.S. ordinance seems to invite challenges on the basis that the ordinance may contribute to, but does not substantially advance, the
stated goals of the ordinance. Moreover, the "adjustment" provision
to resolve conflicts with constitutional (and other) law makes clear
the invitation to test the legality of the ordinance instead of making
the ordinance more palatable to landowners affected by the
ordinance.
c.

Evaluation of Loss

Even ordinances that substantially advance a legitimate regulatory interest can effect a taking. The beachfront owner in Lucas, for
example, did not challenge the purpose or terms of the regulation
that rendered his residential lots useless-he simply asked for compensation. In contrast, the mining corporations in Keystone based
their takings claim -on both the purpose, and effectiveness, of the
Subsidence Act and on the Act's effect on economically viable uses
and investment-backed expectations. Unable to show a severe impact
on mining operations or profitability, the mining corporations were
denied compensation for loss of economically viable use of their land.
State courts have struggled with the concept of "economically
viable use," since no clear definition exists in U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence. An Arizona Court of Appeals, for example, expressed
concern in 1986 that the earlier Arizona Supreme Court's Fehlner
definition-"use for any purpose to which [the subject property] is
reasonably adapted"-might be inconsistent with federal standards,
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since the definition would include an unprofitable use.100 A new definition of economically viable use-one that allows "a reasonable return on the property"-was then adopted.101 In a similar effort to
.clarify the meaning of "economically viable use," the Indiana Supreme Court in 1989 introduced the terms "productive use." 1 2 Despite their ambiguity, the "reasonable return" and "productive use"
standards are obviously intended to counter the perception, culminating in First English, that no taking has occurred if a landowner
has any use whatsoever left after a regulation. As Justice Souter said
in a 1985 New Hampshire Supreme Court opinion, quoting an earlier opinion, the "owner need not be deprived of all valuable use of
his property. If the denial of use is substantial, and is especially onerous, a taking occurs." 10 3
The extent of the losses which would be caused by the S.O.S.
ordinance is not yet known, but the highly restrictive terms of the
ordinance suggest that "economically viable uses" of some tracts will
be denied, thus interfering with "investment-backed. expectations".
(Of course, the success of such claims will depend on how those
terms are defined.) Calculating the economic impact of an ordinance
may not be the same as calculating the amount of land lost by impervious cover limitations; under the Arizona* and Indiana tests
above, economically viable use conceivably could be lost by restricting impervious cover to twenty-five percent. For example, if a large
tract was recently purchased for middle-income, single-family, small
lot, residential development, in response to, and for a price reflecting,
a market indicating a demand for such housing (and not a demand
for large lot homes or cluster homes), a limitation of 25 % impervious cover could make the project unprofitable and reduce the land
value significantly. Moreover, the impervious cover allowances (1525 %) can be reduced even further, to prevent water pollution, under
Part 2(a) of the S.O.S. ordinance. Apart from the impervious cover
limitations, if the standards for pollutant loads are impossible to satisfy or are only attainable by prohibitively expensive measures, then
severe impacts upon land value and investment-backed expectations
100. See Ranch 57 v. City of Yuma, 731 P.2d 113, 121-22 (Ariz. App. 1986) (citing
City of Phoenix v. Fehlner, 363 P.2d 607, 611 (Ariz. 1961).
101. 731 P.2d at 121, (citing National Merrit, Inc. v. Weist, 41 N.Y.2d 438, 445-46
(1977) as consistent with the federal standard).
102. See Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d
1000, 1003 (Ind. 1989).
103. See Soucy v. State of New Hampshire, 506 A.2d 288, 290, quoting Burrows v.
City of Keene, 432 A.2d 15, 19-20 (N.H. 1981).
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should theoretically provide the basis for takings claims.
Because there is no set formula for determining when economically viable use of a tract is denied, each inquiry requires a lawsuit
or "adjustment" hearing-the specific property, the particular economic impact, and the landowner's reasonable expectations must be
analyzed. 1"" Unlike many areas of law, therefore, the outcome of one
lawsuit (e.g., challenging the S.O.S. ordinance) will not necessarily
help in predicting the outcome of other lawsuits.
d.

Compensation

"Just compensation" for property taken by the government generally means market value on the date of taking.1 05 Regulatory takings claims, as opposed to eminent domain awards, are complicated
by the possibility that the claimant will receive fair market value for,
and yet retain some use of, the "inversely" condemned property.'
Moreover, abandonment by the government of the regulation that
created the taking remains available as an alternative to payment of
just compensation.
Even if a challenged ordinance is abandoned or adjusted by a
governmental body, a claim for a temporary taking may remain.
First English, which established the remedy for temporary takings,
assumed a complete loss of all use while the regulation was in place.
Nevertheless, the Court found no difference in kind between temporary and permanent takings,10 7 which suggests that the remedy is
available in any case where a taking is established and the regulation
is discontinued.
The potential legal weaknesses of the S.O.S. ordinance outlined
in this section may represent, to some, an overly generous reading of
takings jurisprudence. If so, another (and very different) assessment
of the S.O.S. ordinance was available to provide comfort to the voters in Austin last summer.
2.

Nightmares Aren't Real

Early in the campaign for the S.O.S. ordinance, several Coalition attorneys appeared in a press conference to address concerns
with the regulatory takings doctrine. Noting the ambiguity of
See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495.
See generally R. Rotunda, J. Nowak & J. Young, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.14 (1986).
106. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
107. 482 U.S. at 318.
104.
105.
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Holmes' term "too far," '

attorney Bill Bunch explained that in

subsequent cases down the line [after Mahon] there has almost
never been a regulation that has been held to go too far. On the
other hand, there have been literally hundreds of cases that have
found that ... regulations to protect legitimate public interest[s]..

. did not go too far but were rather legitimate exercises of governmental authority. .

..

"'

Bunch also characterized the S.O.S. ordinance as a regulation
preventing owners of land from harming others, e.g., nuisance regulation.' 10 Another attorney, Jim Cousar, remarked that the Lucas
case (not yet decided at the time of the press conference) would not
in any event affect the S.O.S. ordinance: "This ordinance would not
have a similar effect of rendering land undevelopable, it would not
render land valueless, it would not be like the government coming in
and taking the land for its own use.""' Turning to Texas constitutional law,"' Cousar noted the two threshold takings questions from
Turtle Rock" 3 : (1) is there a legitimate public purpose, and (2) is
108. See supra note 3.
109. Conference, supra note 29, at 5.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 6.
112. Like the United States Constitution, the Constitution of the State of Texas prohibits the taking of a person's property for a public use without adequate compensation. TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 17. However, a municipality is not required to compensate for losses caused by
the proper and reasonable exercise of its police power. City of College Station v. Turtle Rock
Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1984) (citing Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475,
478 (Tex. 1934)).
113. In Turtle Rock, supra note 112, the Houston Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the
trial court decision that a College Station, Texas ordinance, which required parkland dedication (or money in lieu thereof) as a condition of subdivision plat approval, was invalid as a
matter of law. 666 S.W.2d 318 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'd, 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984). The
Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, however, explaining that an ordinance which
required parkland dedication was "not inherently different from other types of municipal land
use regulations such as density controls and street dedication requirements." Turtle Rock, 680
S.W.2d at 806. Two related requirements for the valid exercise of the police power were identified: "First, the regulation must be adopted to accomplish a legitimate goal; it must be 'substantially related' to the health, safety, or general welfare of the people. Second, the regulation
must be reasonable; it cannot be arbitrary." Id. at 805. The court found that "the concept of
public welfare has a broad range" and that a "presumption favors the validity of the ordinance." Id. Thus, the court rejected the court of appeals' holding that "as a matter of law, a
parkland dedication requirement does not bear a substantial relation to the health, safety, or
general welfare of the community." Id. (The court of appeals' holding was based on Berg
Development Co. v. City of Missouri City, 603 S.W.2d 273, 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) which
found a similar parkland dedication requirement unconstitutional.) The court remanded directing that the College Station ordinance be tested for arbitrariness and unreasonableness, the
second of its two requirements for the valid exercise of the police power. Turtle Rock, 680

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:11

the ordinance reasonable (i.e., not arbitrary)? Protecting water quality, Cousar explained, is clearly a legitimate purpose, if not a duty
under the Texas Water Code, and as to the second inquiry,
there is a strong presumption of reasonableness .... Now when the
court [asks] is this measure arbitrary and is it unreasonable ...f,
t]he issue is not [whether this is] the best way .. .[or] ...the
least intrusive way to protect water quality. Instead a ...measure
is going to be found reasonable by a Texas court if there is any
reasonable basis for the governmental body to believe that this
measure is going to achieve [its] goals.11"
If reasonable minds can differ, Cousar concluded, then an enactment
will "pass Texas Constitutional muster." 115
Finally, Cousar identified two additional guidelines in Texas
takings jurisprudence, including the principle that a regulation that
totally destroys the value of property or renders it wholly useless is
probably a taking, and the principle that the government cannot regulate property for an invalid purpose, such as to create a buffer zone
without paying for it.' 1 6 On the first issue, the authors of the S.O.S.
initiative clearly believed that allowing 15-25 % buildable area insulates the ordinance from a "loss of economically viable use" claim.
On the second issue, even though a genuine possibility for a claim of
subterfuge exists in Austin, Cousar shifted his analysis, and remarked that the City of Austin is obviously not trying to reduce the
value of land in order to acquire it." 7 One cannot be too critical of
Cousar, speaking as a lobbyist at the press conference, for his characterization of the takings doctrine, yet the most vulnerable features
of the S.O.S. ordinance were not addressed in his remarks. Given the
history of judicial deference to governmental land-use regulation,
however, Cousar's comments are not unreasonable.
During the last week of June, just over a month before the vote
on the ordinance, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its Lucas opinion,
which might have been seen to challenge the understanding of regulatory takings held by S.O.S. Coalition attorneys.
S.W.2d at 808.
114. Conference, supra note 29, at 7-8; see Turtle Rock, 680 S.W.2d at 805.
115. Conference, supra note 29, at 8.
116. Id.; see City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978) (denial. of permit to
acquire a scenic easement was invalid use of police power).
117. Conference, supra note 29, at 9.
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III.

POST-LUCAS TAKINGS DOCTRINE IN THE S.O.S.
CONTROVERSY

A.

Doctrinal Refinements

Because Lucas'18 was just another "ad hoc, fact-based" inquiry,
there was no reason to expect more than general guidance from the
Court on the status of regulatory takings doctrine. In the context of
the S.O.S. controversy in Austin, however, Lucas seemed to suggest
that the potential for takings claims following an aggressive environmental regulation should not be dismissed so quickly.
For example, the characterization of the S.O.S. ordinance as a
nuisance abatement measure, typically discussed as an exception to
the obligation to compensate landowners, is similar to the characterization by the South Carolina Supreme Court that the 1988 Beachfront Management Act (prohibiting construction on Lucas's two
oceanfront lots) as a law which "merely" regulated use and prevented "a serious public harm." That rationale was rejected by the
U.S. Supreme Court, which confirmed that recitation of a nuisance
justification does not remove environmental regulations from the
scope of the takings clause." 9 The loss by Lucas of all economically
viable use of his land is a compensable taking unless the Coastal
Council can point to clear "background principles" of nuisance law
that prohibit his proposed use-something which the Court did not
consider likely; on remand, the prediction came true.' Characterization of the prohibition on beachfront development as nuisance pre118. In 1986, David Lucas, a South Carolina real estate developer, bought two lots on a
coastal barrier island near Charleston. At the time, no regulation prohibited development of
the lots, and he planned to construct two houses. In 1988, however, South Carolina passed a
new Beachfront Management Act that barred any permanent habitable structures close to the
high water mark, and Lucas' lots were within the restricted area. Lucas sued in state court,
conceding that the Act advanced a legitimate public interest, but as applied to him and his lots
resulted in an unconstitutional taking without compensation. The trial court concluded that the
Act deprived Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the land, and agreed that this amounted
to a taking that required compensation. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, see 404
S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), deferring to the legislature's finding that new construction in the
coastal zone threatened a valuable public resource, reasoning that Lucas has failed to attack
the Act's validity, and holding that the takings doctrine does not require compensation for loss
of land use by reason of regulations enacted to prevent serious public harm. The South Carolina Supreme Court characterized the Act as a law that "merely" regulated use to abate a
public nuisance.
As described in the text above, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded for review
of "background principles of [South Carolina] nuisance and property law." 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2901-02 (1992).
119. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897-99.
120. Id. at 2895; see Lucas, 1992 WL 358097 (S.C.) (Nov. 20, 1992).
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vention, a dissenting South Carolina Supreme Court judge pointed
out, "would totally eviscerate the takings clause."'' This concern
with interpreting the "nuisance exception" too broadly echoes the
concern of the dissenting justices in Keystone, who reminded the majority that nuisance regulation is not intended to prevent an essential
use, and that "our cases have never applied the nuisance exception122to
allow complete extinction of the value of a parcel of property.
Significantly, the Court found that Lucas had been deprived of
all economically feasible use even though he could use the property
to construct wooden walkways and decks, or for recreational purposes, or even to sell or lease beach access to others.' 23 Thus, loss of
"all economically feasible use" does not appear to mean "wholly useless" or "loss of all value" as suggested by the S.O.S. Coalition attorneys. Moreover, Lucas confirms that a "landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete" may be entitled to compensation:
Such an owner might not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical formulation [i.e., all economically viable use], but, as we
have acknowledged time and again, "the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and ... the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"
are keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.1 2
While not exactly encouraging compensation claims, the Court's language will likely add some Austin plaintiffs to the field of takings
litigation.
On the presumption of reasonableness that the S.O.S. attorneys
suggested should protect municipalities from takings claims, the Lucas court was hesitant to "indulge [its] usual assumption that the
legislature is simply 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life,' . . . in a manner that secures an 'average reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned. . . 2 Again, these words must be
read as part of a case involving a "total" loss by the landowner, but
the Court seems to be chipping away at earlier presumptions. Moreover, the Court rejects any presumption of reasonableness based on a
recital that a regulation prevents harm: "Since such a justification
can be formulated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 905 (Harwell, J., dissenting).
480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
Id. at 2895 n.8, (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
Id. at 2894 (citations omitted).
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whether the legislature has a stupid staff."' 26 The Court thus appears to be creating at least a mood of concern for those who were
not worried about takings claims prior to Lucas, as well as for those
27
who thought the outcome in Lucas would not matter.
Should Lucas matter? More to the point for the S.O.S. initiative, could it be made to matter, politically, in the final weeks of the
campaign?
B.

The TPPF Study

One of the present authors, David Caudill, was hired in late
June by the Texas Public Policy Foundation ("TPPF") to make an
assessment of the potential for takings litigation in the event the
S.O.S. ordinance was passed.12 8 TPPF is an independent, conservative research center dedicated to influencing public policy debate in
Texas. Earlier conferences and studies supported by TPPF focused
on numerous educational, tax and legal issues, and included contributions to the debate over the so-called litigation crisis which were
critical of current liability, malpractice, and contingency fee policies
in Texas. The decision by the TPPF Board to enter the fray in Austin, however, probably represented a concern not with the litigation
"explosion" but with economic growth and with open and responsive
government.
In the final weeks of the S.O.S. campaign, opponents of the ordinance questioned the City Council's failure to disclose the results
of its own staff's, as well as its outside counsel's, investigation into
the potential for lawsuits against the City of Austin should the
S.O.S. ordinance pass. 2 9 Certain members of the S.O.S. opposition
appeared before the City Council to argue that the voters needed
that information since they, not the Council, would decide whether
to adopt the S.O.S. ordinance. A request for disclosure was made
under the Texas Open Records Act, but the City Attorney declined
126. Id. at 2898 n.12.
127. Richard Reuben, Taking Cover, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Jan. 1993, at 32 (interview
with Joseph Sax and Michael Berger where Professor Sax opines that the Court in Lucas is
"beating the drum" by "saying some things that are supportive of property owners in order to
make regulators back off").
128. See David S. Caudill, Austin's "Save Our Springs" Ordinance: The Legal Implications of Going Too Far, TEXAS PUB. POLICY FOUND. (July 1992).
129. Early in the S.O.S. campaign, the City of Austin asked its own legal staff and two
outside counsel (Bickerstaff, Heath & Smiley of Austin, and Taylor & Fielding of Fort
Worth) to analyze the legality of the ordinance. The results were presented to the City Council
in closed executive session. See Bob Burns, Council to Consider releasingS.O.S. studies, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 5, 1992, at Bi.
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to release the information, claiming attorney-client privilege. 13 0 Of
course, the opponents of the S.O.S. initiative thought that the information would serve to question the legality of the ordinance and
would predict a rash of litigation.
In order to provide a litigation risk assessment to the voters, the
TPPF presented its study at a press conference in July. The study
generally reflected the analysis of the ordinance given in Section
II.B. 1. of this article, and was used by opponents of the S.O.S. initiative to support their attack on the ordinance by suggesting that the
study represented the information held back from the voters by the
City Council. "1
C.

The Shadow of Lucas Disappears

In the final weeks of the campaign, the media coverage of the
Texas Open Records Act request again placed Lucas and the regulatory takings doctrine into the S.O.S. controversy. In response to any
concerns that might have been raised about the constitutionality of
the ordinance, the S.O.S. Coalition turned to several legal scholars
for assessments, publicizing the results. A letter from Professor Joseph Sax to the S.O.S. Coalition campaign manager concluded that
the ordinance was not vulnerable to a takings challenge; Sax pointed
out the difference between the prohibition in Lucas and the allowance of some structure in Austin, and also observed that in the rare
event that someone's "economically beneficial use" is lost, the adjustment provision insulates the ordinance from any facial challenge. 132 Four University of Texas law professors also prepared a
memorandum concluding that the ordinance, whatever its wisdom
"as a matter of public policy, . . . does not violate the Constitution."1 3 The memorandum emphasized the deference typically given
130. The City Council was advised by the city legal staff that it could vote to waive the
attorney-client privilege and release the studies. That option was made an agenda item for the
last meeting of the City Council prior to the election, but the item was withdrawn by the
Council Member who placed it on the agenda. Id.
131. A publication, entitled AUSTIN COURIER, was prepared by the Citizens for Responsible Planning, and sent to over 90,000 Austin residents, citing the TPPF Study and warning
the voters of potential liability to the City from takings claims. Foundation Study: "SOS"
Ordinance Fatally Flawed, AUSTIN COURIER, July 1992, at 3.
132. See letter from Joseph Sax, Research Studies & Services, to Mark Yznaga, Campaign Manager, Save Our Springs Coalition, (July 21, 1992) (copy on file with the Hofstra
Property Law Journal).
133. Memorandum Regarding S.O.S. Ordinance from Jordan Steiker, Douglas Laycock,
Sanford V. Levinson & Thomas 0. McGarity (July 22, 1992) (copy on file with the Hofstra
Property Law Journal).
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to local authorities as well as the irrelevance of the "total taking"
standard in Lucas.
Despite the confidence of such assessments, they do not necessarily imply a belief in doctrinal consistency in the field of regulatory
takings. One might, for example, believe that there are hard cases
which problematize current takings doctrine and highlight its ambiguities, but then conclude that the S.O.S. ordinance is an easy case,
a "run-of-the-mill health and safety regulation."' 34 One might also
believe that current takings doctrine is flexible enough to justify almost any result in Austin-the view of the present authors-but also
believe that judicial deference is almost guaranteed, perhaps due to
the lack of any real guidelines. Whatever the basis for finding the
S.O.S. ordinance bullet-proof, it is likely that many voters concerned
with the legality of the ordinance believed that it was.
IV.

THE POLITICS OF DOCTRINE

It's not even about water quality. ... It's a battle about political
13
control in Austin.

5

The adoption of the S.O.S. ordinance in Austin can be understood or "read" in various ways. While the turnout for the vote on
the ordinance was only about one-fourth of the registered voters, 138
the initiative process represents a striking example of direct citizen
control over local land-use planning. From the perspective of S.O.S.
proponents, this process was necessary due to the failures of the
elected City Council and the planning commission to adopt and enforce regulations to protect water quality. On the other hand, those
opposed to the ordinance viewed the process as one in which the
powerful image of deteriorating water quality eclipsed any serious
consideration of whether the ordinance will be effective, of property
rights, and of the need for economically sound development. While
the polarization of the community into environmentalist and economic development factions was not new in Austin, the shift from
City Council and planning commission chambers as the locus of land
use planning to the field of political campaigns was new.
The significance of that shift is not that the land-use planning
process became politicized-lobbying for or against a proposed project before the City Council is highly political-but that appeals to
134.
135.
136.

Id.
White, supra note 38, at I (quoting Austin attorney Terry Irion).
See Collier, supra note 10, at A19.,
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the relevant legal doctrines were made in a new forum. Land-use
regulation in Austin, as in many cities, typically takes the form of
ordinances passed by the City Council after public hearings and debate among those interested, together with an approval process for
particular projects, again involving public hearings and debate
before the City Council and/or its planning commission. Typically,
as well, concessions are made by the proponents and opponents of an
ordinance or project proposal, such that no "side" gets everything it
wants. In the process of drafting ordinances, the City Attorney and
his or her staff is involved, and attorneys representing particular interests typically appear in public hearings to make suggestions. The
goal, obviously, is to create a regulatory scheme fair to all citizens
and landowners balancing health, safety, and welfare concerns
against perceived property rights.
Recall that the S.O.S. ordinance appeared first as a draft proposal for City Council consideration, and became a ballot initiative out
of concern that it had been watered down in negotiations over a final
ordinance. Indeed, the S.O.S. Coalition campaigned on the basis that
Austin's existing regulations had too many waiver provisions and exemptions, and were thus ineffective in protecting the environment.
Earlier ordinances were viewed by the S.O.S. Coalition as having
been infected with developer lobbyists and City Council campaign
contributions. 37
Once the process became a political campaign for public approval of the ordinance, the City Attorney's assessment as well as
the assessment of attorneys hired by the city of the legality of the
S.O.S. ordinance was kept within the closed sessions of the City
Council. In the public forum, the debate over regulatory takings was
either ignored or "won" by the S.O.S. Coalition attorneys. The pattern in Austin during the campaign seemed to be that opponents of
the S.O.S. ordinance, with the advice of attorneys, would raise the
specter of regulatory takings claims, in a press conference or newspaper interview or in campaign materials, and then the S.O.S. Coalition attorneys would explain that the proposed ordinance was legal
and that any argument to the contrary was mere political rhetoric
137. See Conference, supra note 29, at 2:
By eliminating all of those special dispensations that can be granted by City Councils at the behest of lobbyists and with the influence of campaign contributions we
hope to have an ordinance that is applied fairly to everyone, the little guy and the
big guys as well so that big guys don't essentially buy their way out of it.
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paid for by developers who cared little for the environment. One explanation for the victory of the S.O.S. Coalition, if the appeal to
legal doctrine was significant in the campaign, is that its attorneys
were right-the Austin ordinance is not unconstitutional. On the
other hand, to the extent that current regulatory takings doctrine is
a set of ambiguous factors with few guidelines for their applicability,
then its role as an aid to political debate is somewhat illusory.
A.

Appeals to an Unappealing Doctrine

Given the doctrinal confusion that follows the takings clause,
neither municipal planners nor voters in land-use initiative campaigns are likely to feel constrained by constitutional considerations.
If the regulatory takings doctrine is in a state of flux, then its limits
arguably should, for the public welfare, be tested; in the rare event a
challenge is successful, then the courts have done their job and the
challenged regulation can be lifted. Even if some cost to the municipality results, the risk was small in light of the controversy among
judges and academics over the definition of a taking as well as the
damages to be assessed. Notwithstanding this logic, opponents of the
S.O.S. ordinance hoped that the regulatory takings doctrine would
be viewed by voters as a significant limitation on land-use planning
by initiative, even though that doctrine
poses an almost imponderable question. How can the same government which is to protect the property rights of the citizenry be
charged with creating and altering those rights? The takings clause
is designed to remind us of this question and never to allow the
government to act without examining whether indeed it has gone
"too far." In this sense defining the takings question is itself "the
answer" and a detailed understanding of the riddles the question
poses is our best protection against both majoritarian tyranny and
the illegitimate claims of the economically entrenched.138
In Austin, Texas, and probably in most cities, those viewed as
"the economically entrenched" have trouble in political discourse
making a convincing claim of "majoritarian tyranny." Large developers typically are assumed to have ample resources to influence legislators, regulators and courts, thus courts arguably need not worry
about the impact on developers of majoritarian legislation. 139 The
138. Paul, infra note 140, at 1524.
139. See Burton, supra note 96, at 95 (citing Mandelker, Reversing the Presumption of
Constitutionality in Land Use Litigation: Is Legislative Action Necessary?, 30 WASH. U.J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5, 14 (1986)); but cf. Mandelker & Tarlock, supra note 96, at 32 n.120
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S.O.S. ordinance campaign, however, may serve to challenge that
presumption. First, the business community, including developers,
was not particularly successful in the campaign arena; second, the
ordinance targeted large developers-most property owners of developed residential or commercial properties were unaffected by the ordinance, and owners of small undeveloped tracts not requiring subdivision were exempt unless more than 8000 square feet of impervious
cover was proposed for development. Not only was the image of losing the environment far more powerful in the S.O.S. campaign than
the image of losing property rights, but the loss of property rights
was limited generally to a minority not likely to be viewed as helpless victims. The Summer of '92 in Austin was. not, therefore, an
atmosphere conducive to reflection of the need to clarify the rights of
property owners.
The form of the S.O.S. ordinance is significant because it highlights the goal of preserving water quality before exempting all existing, including large, development and future development of existing lots for residential or small commercial use (less than 8000
square feet of impervious cover). The ordinance could easily be rewritten, with no change in its content, to confirm that the restrictions
on impervious cover and the requirement of runoff controls apply
only to new development of large tracts-all new intensive residential or commercial development is prohibited by the impervious cover
restrictions even if runoff is controlled, and all existing properties
(including large developments) that contribute to degradation of
water quality are unaffected by the ordinance. Admittedly, new
small development is not as likely to degrade the environment as
large development. Nevertheless, under this reading of the S.O.S.
ordinance, the prevention of growth through the denial of develop(suggesting that "all contenders in the land-use decision-making process [are equally] deserving of judicial protection through presumption-shifting").
For analyses of the takings dilemma that focus on the political power of those affected by
regulation, see S. Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 308321 (1990). "[T]he law reflects a concern for minorities that are unlikely to be able to take
care of themselves through the political process." Id. at 310; see also Gregory S. Alexander,
Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic of Property, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 259, 269-74
(1992). "Persons who are part of a political coalition or who can easily form one have a
weaker basis for objecting when regulators place restrictions on them since they can protect
their interests through politics." Id. at 271; see also G. Lunney, A CriticalReexamination of
the Takings Jurisprudence,90 MicH. L. REv. 1892, 1948-1955 (1992). "The Constitutional
compensation requirement can be seen as a tool to remedy the failure of voice that would
otherwise occur when a concentrated and a dispersed group struggle' over property." Id. at
1954.
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ment "rights", and not water quality preservation, is more clearly
revealed as its primary goal.
Our alternative reading of the ordinance was not hidden during
the campaign, as most voters realized that the ordinance did not affect them, except perhaps by increasing the value of their property.
Moreover, those campaigning for the ordinance emphasized that the
most significant degradation of water quality is caused by large developments, so that limiting the effect of the ordinance to new large
developments made perfect sense. The problem, however, is that the
terms of the ordinance betray a desire to prohibit new intensive development on aesthetic grounds. The purely aesthetic, and not water
quality, rationale for the ordinance is demonstrated by its prohibition
even of large developments that might find a way to preserve water
quality.
Attempts to disclose the "no-growth" agenda behind the ordinance were either unsuccessful or they backfired-that is, people
may have actually voted for the ordinance to slow growth in Austin.
While preserving water quality is a good reason to reduce development, targeting large tract owners to pay-by reducing impervious
cover and establishing water quality controls-for a new water quality program to benefit everyone appears to be a regulatory takings
scenario. The situation is analogous to one in which a developer is
required to contribute to a fund to protect water quality when the
developer's own project does not degrade water quality.
B.

Pauline Structuralism

After all, the takings clause cannot serve as a protection of individual rights if the courts defer to mercurial majority beliefs. 40
Jeremy' Paul, in an important and lengthy contribution to the
already massive canon of takings scholarship,"" presents a compelling critique of recent attempts, by the Court and by respected scholars, to bring order to the doctrinal chaos of takings law. Paul identifies in takings jurisprudence a series of recurring tensions between
individual rights and collective interests, 42 between formalism and
140. Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393,
1527 (1991).
141. See Paul, supra note 140.
142. Id. at 1402-03. For another account of the tension in takings jurisprudence between
property rights and communitarian principles, see Alexander, supra note 139, at 259.
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ad hoc balancing,14 and between physicalist and market models of
property rights.1" He also attempts to demonstrate our inability to
resolve those tensions by recounting the failures of those who have
tried.1 45 Reminiscent of his earlier critique of Epstein, 1 6 however,
Paul relies upon and finds much to admire in those whom he attacks.
Moreover, because the targets of his latest criticism are spread
across the entire "political" spectrum, Paul is able almost to transcend political differences and show both (i) that everybody is half
right, and (ii) that irreconcilable notions are part of property law.
Paul does not conclude, however, that nothing can be done, but
rather makes some modest suggestions as to the directions that
courts might take-each involving acknowledgment of contradictory
visions of property in our laws-to give the takings clause meaning
without sacrificing either individual rights or collective needs in the
process.14 7 Without attempting to capture Paul's comprehensive survey, we briefly summarize his arguments and then turn to his recommendations as a prelude to our own.
Paul identifies two styles of adjudication preferred, respectively,
by two different types of critics of contemporary takings jurisprudence: fidelity to a unified theory 4 8 and the balancing of conflicting
values.1 49 The former approach, which promises predictability, is
plagued with "too many compelling and conflicting theories for any
to account accurately for American attitudes toward the takings dilemma." 1 0 The latter approach, to which the Supreme Court professes allegiance, is preferred by Paul, but this "ad hoc" approach is
often a cover for hidden, formalist pre-commitments. 151 The virtue of
the formalist approach-the attempt to identify fundamental values-is missing in the ad hoc approach: "the Court is often willing
to apply its many factors without explicitly linking them to the
Court's underlying vision of the values private property serves in a
1 52
democratic society.
143. See Paul, supra note 140 at 1399-1401.
144. Id. at 1416-29.
145. Id. at 1429-1542.
146. See Paul, supra note 53.
147. Paul, supra note 140, at 1542-48.
148. Id. at 1399-1400.
149. Id. at 1400-01.
150. Id. at 1401.
151. Id. at 1401 (stating that "[aictual application of the multi-factor balancing test
reveals a commitment to precisely the same formal modes of property that wreak havoc with
attempts to develop a single unified theory").
152. Id. at 1402.
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In contemporary attempts to draw a line between individual and
collective property rights, Paul identifies a "physicalist" and a "market" model of property, each of which is supposed to help break out
of the circle implied by the government's role in establishing and
then protecting property rights. Since "[c]ourts could use their authority to set social practices to which they could then seemingly
defer as the noncontroversial source of property rights, [physicalism-control and possession of something-offers] . . . a feature of
social life that appears largely independent of judicial manipulation. ' 153 The physicalist model sometimes appears to work and provides a foundation for much of property law, but it provides no resolution in many cases, as Paul's examples illustrate, and the
resolutions it provides seem to result from judicial manipulation of
the model. 154 Enter the market model, emphasizing the sequence in
the property circle: the government makes the rules and then protects the regime, e.g., by requiring compensation if the public demands rule changes. 15 5 However, the distinction between a new rule,
which can be characterized as a mere extension of existing law, and
an established rule is hazy and, again, leaves plenty of room for judicial manipulation. 56 Both models are used by courts, sometimes in
the same opinion, and both provide an opportunity for courts to
avoid "squarely facing their role as repeated definers of property
' 57
rights.'
The Supreme Court, by its rejection of unified theories in favor
of an ad hoc approach, impliedly rejects the generalizations of the
physicalist and market models. The ad hoc approach thus gives the
Court (i) more leeway than a market model would allow, (ii) an
opportunity "to pay lip service" to traditional definitions of property
while "upholding a wide array of regulations," and (iii) an ability to
adapt to new situations without either altering existing doctrine or
articulating its own theory of property.' 5 8 However, like the return of
the repressed in Freudian theory, the physicalist and market models
alternatively reappear (with all their inadequacies) as courts weigh
in a takings challenge the character of the governmental action, the
153. Id. at 1418.
154. See id. at 1416-23.
155. Id. at 1423.
156. Id. at 1423-25.
157. Id. at 1429.
158. Id. at 1430-31. "Taken to its logical extreme, the market model would ...
government." Id. at 1479.

freeze
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severity of economic impact, and the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations. 159 Without condemning the ad hoc
approach, Paul argues that "the Court needs substantive criteria for
deciding when physicalist notions will prevail and when the simpler
market model will justify compensation because there has been a
change in the rules." 160 Such criteria should not be "highly general
formulations ... [that] provide little guidance on the connection between rule and application," but might include developing "paradigm cases in which government must or need not pay."' 61 Paul also
suggests that judicial willingness to deviate from the "market value
compensation" rule for takings, which rule could make regulation
expensive and thus leads courts to defer to legislatures, might allow
courts to see the merits of opposing readings of the takings clause,
and encourage courts "to focus more precisely on which economic
values the takings clause protects."' 6 2 In his attempt to supplement
the ad hoc approach with a "vision of the values property serves in a
democratic republic," Paul suggests that the right to shelter may be
a core human need that deserves protection. 1 3
The search for a unified theory to stabilize takings law, Paul
observes, risks becoming either an appeal to pre-existing values-which requires ignoring conflicting values that seem just as
pre-existent--or an appeal to majoritarian values-which renders
the takings clause meaningless. 16 Theories based on the harm/benefit 16 5 or right/freedom 6 6 distinctions suffer from "multiple charac159. Id. at 1432.
160. Id. at 1457-58.
161. Id. at 1463.
162. Id. at 1491-92.
[A] rethinking of the rule that requires market compensation in eminent domain
cases would have a marked "debundling" effect on the idea of property.... An
alternative approach to the valuation problem would emphasize that each physical
taking involves the alternation of many legal rules and that only some of those rules
deserve protection against majoritarian redistribution.

Id.
163. Id. at 1524, 1544.
164. Id. at 1525-26. The first error is found in Epstein, supra note 75, and the second in
Andrea Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles: Part l-Takings
as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral Justification, 78 CAL. L. REV. 55
(1990). "Professor Peterson has merely suggested that a sacrifice is not unfair if the public
believes a citizen would be wrong not to make it." Paul, supra note 140, at 1525; see also
supra note 119 and accompanying text.
165. Paul, supra note 140, at 1529 (referring to Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149, 161-65 (1971)).
166. Paul, supra note 140, at 1532-33 (referringto John A. Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation & Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L.
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terizations of the same events." ' 7 Similarly, appeals to generalizations like utility, fairness, or "just shares" of governmental burdens
are "open to such vast differences in interpretation that it is not clear
whether [they] can settle any particular controversy." 1 68 Such anomalies lead Paul to recommend development of "an intermediate level
of generality"' 69 in takings jurisprudence-"a doctrinal framework
that helps to identify, but does not determine, when private claims to
economic stability fit within the Constitution's contemplated
safeguards.""" 0
In agreement with Paul's analysis generally, but not wanting to
develop his "right-to-shelter-as-core-human-need" inquiry, we highlight two of the numerous takings principles that require elucidation,
and we suggest formulations of each that might ensure that the takings clause is taken seriously. We consider briefly, but reject, several
legislative and executive attempts to clarify recurrent doctrinal confusion, and we conclude that the judiciary must, and realistically
could, respond to some of the deficiencies in current takings law.
C.

Taking Doctrine Seriously

Finding "intermediate" guidelines that are neither determinative nor utterly manipulable is necessary if the takings clause is to
remain meaningful in political controversies over land use control.
We focus below on two principles underlying the takings clause-the
requirement that a regulation substantially advance a legitimate
state interest and the requirement to compensate those singled out to
bear a public burden-and suggest how those principles-weak as
they are in current doctrine-might be strengthened even in the absence of a unified theory.
1. Substantial Advancement
Whether or not a governmental action affecting property rights
"substantiallyadvances a legitimate state interest" is not a particularly hard test to pass.... It has been rare for a court to find
that a regulation does not "substantially advance" a legitimate
REv. 243, 262-67 (1982)).
167. Paul, supra note 140, at 1533.
168. Id. at 1536-40 (referring to Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165
(1967), and Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Modelfor the Takings
Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983) ("just share" theory)).
169. Paul, supra note 140, at 1543.
170. Id.
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governmental interest.1 71

While scholars concerned with the presumption that almost any
17
regulation advances a public purpose were encouraged by Nollan, 1
Jeremy Paul, in his analysis of the indeterminacy of current takings
doctrine, is less than enamored with Justice Scalia's "attack on previously settled takings jurisprudence." 7 ' That is, Paul -is less concerned with the flexibility of the current "substantial advancement"
test than he is with the Court's reluctance to examine self-critically
its vision(s) of property, and Nollan represents for Paul that persistent reluctance.1 7 4 Not only are inquiries into legislative intent difficult, but the ambiguities of the harm/benefit distinction, and of the
substantial/insubstantial duality, leave the Nollan test in disarray. 7 5
Paul does not, however, explore contemporary legislative efforts
to offer some level of predictability to the field of land-use planning.
While we share Paul's conviction that courts, and not merely legislatures, must respond to the takings controversy, a brief summary of
several extra-judicial efforts to fill some of the gaps in takings jurisprudence may provide insights as to how courts should react.
Consider Colorado's vested property rights statute, passed "to
ensure reasonable certainty, stability and fairness in the land use
planning process .... ,,171 Given that vested rights analysis can be as
indeterminate as takings analyses,1 77 Texas has a similar statute con171. J. Burling, Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and other Critters Is It Against Nature to Pay for a Taking?, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309, 335 (1992)
(discussing those rare cases, including Nollan, where the test was given serious consideration).
172. See id.
173. Paul, supra note 140, at 1398.
174. Id. at 1463-65.
175. Id. at 1434-35.
The Keystone opinion resuscitated Professor Freund's . . . [argument] that . . . the
government should be required to pay compensation when it required one citizen to
sacrifice for the benefit of the community but . . . not . . . when the government
prevents a citizen from harming neighbors or the community.
Professor Michelman . . . demonstrates that when government engages in activities designed to increase the public welfare by favoring one resource over another
there is no readily discernable way to determine whether a harm has been prevented
or a benefit created.
Id. at 1438-39.
176. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-68-101 to 24-68-106 (West 1990).
177. Vested rights doctrines vary considerably from state to state, and the disputed issue
in vested rights cases is usually, when does a landowner have a right to build? Upon conditional approval? Final approval? Upon issuance of a building permit? Upon moving dirt
around? After construction of a foundation? See generally Walter F. Witt, Vested Rights in
Land Uses-A View From The Practitioner's Perspective, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J.
317 (1986).
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firming that conditional approval of a building permit generally
"freezes" the regulations applicable to the project.178 Consider, as
well, development agreement statutes, which enable cities to fix by
contract the regulations that apply to a project in an effort to reduce
cost, waste, and inefficiency in the development process.1 79 While development agreements are common even without statutory guidance,
problems that arise concerning their legality and political desirability
are minimized when a statutory framework for such agreements is
available to planners and developers. 8" Finally, and most important
for the present inquiry, impact fee statutes passed by some states, in
the wake of Nollan, are intended to provide guidance to municipal
planners by establishing an orderly, relatively predictable process for
the adoption and assessment of impact fees on developers.
The Texas Impact Fee Act, 18 ' for example, contemplates initial
and continual scrutiny of impact fees by (i) requiring thorough research, analysis, and data-based justification; 8 ' (ii) defining a limited array of capital improvements that may be funded by such
fees; 8' and (iii) demanding rigid accountability for the expenditure
of fees collected. 84 Fees can only be assessed to fund the cost of
roads and water, waste water, or drainage facilities necessitated by
and attributable to the proposed development. 85 Service demands
must be empirically established in a "plan," and fees imposed must
be proportionate to those service demands.' 86 The Texas Impact Fee
Act also provides for notice and public hearings, and appointment of
an advisory committee, whose members must include representatives
of the real estate, development or building industries, prior to levying
an impact fee.' 87 The plan and its assumptions must be updated at
least every three years. 88
178. See TEXAS GOV'T CODE ANN § 481.143.
179. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN
§ 163.3229 (West Supp. 1987).
180. See Wm. Terry Bray et al., supra note 11, at 28-35; see also Bruce M. Kramer,
Development Agreements: To What Extent Are They Enforceable, 10 REAL. EST. L. J. 29
(1981); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65
N.C. L. REV. 957 (1987).
181. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 395.001-395.080 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
182. Id. §9 395.014, 395.012, 395.024.
183. Id. § 395.012.
184. Id. § 395.024.
185. Id. § 395.012; see also § 395.001(1).
186. Id. §8 395.014-395.015.
187. Id. § 395.044; see also § 395.058.
188. Id. § 395.052.
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Several features of the Texas Impact Fee Act seem to provide a
model approach to the takings dilemma, at least with respect to the
overly flexible "substantial advancement" test. First, attention is focused on the regulatory process as if there is a problem, as if too
much unpredictability is harmful. 8 9 Second, the burden of justification and quantification is shifted to the regulator as if such matters
should be addressed prior to adoption of an ordinance, not in takings
litigation. 90 Third, the burdens imposed on a developer must be proportionate to the public needs created by the development, as if
there must be "reciprocity of advantage" in land-use regulation. 1 9'
Fourth, in addition to a notice and hearing requirement, an advisory
committee (impliedly with members from the business community as
well as planning professionals) is established to ensure that the municipality hears from those representing various interests, as if there
is a growing possibility that business interests will be ignored.' 92
Fifth, and finally, allowable and inappropriate types of regulation
are specified, as if there is a "risk that private property [can be]
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm." 193 Significantly, however, shifting the problem of judicial failure to provide guidelines (to local regulators and
the regulated) to the state legislature does not significantly address
the problem of establishing limits on majoritarian control. 9 Any
"heightened scrutiny" established by the legislature can be as easily
disestablished.
In a similar effort to draw guidance from the Trilogy, Executive
Order No. 12630 was issued in 1988 requiring a takings implication
assessment from any federal agency proposing a regulation affecting
land use.195 The assessment must set forth both the risks that a compensable taking will occur and the potential financial exposure from
the action if a taking does occur. The order, however, has been criticized as unworkable, primarily because the doctrine of regulatory
189. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
191. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491-93 (1987).
192. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
193. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
194. See Lunney, supra note 139, at 1943-44 ("[The] constitutional requirement of
compensation makes sense only if it is intended as a limit on the legislature's authority in this
area .... [The] presence of the compensation requirement in the Fifth Amendment [and in
almost all state constitutions] suggests that we are not willing to trust our elected representatives [to provide compensation when appropriate].").
195. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554 (1988).
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takings is so unclear and the guidelines accompanying the order do
little to clarify that doctrine. 196 Like an impact fee statute, the order
reflected a kind of "burden of proof" shift-a responsibility was
placed on regulators to draft regulations under the shadow of the
takings doctrine. Nevertheless, until courts are willing to entertain
197
the possibility of shifting the burden of justification to regulators,
and to give regulators some guidance as to when a legitimate interest
is "substantially advanced", legislative and executive attempts to define property rights are a guessing game.
On the Monday following the weekend passage of the S.O.S.
ordinance, the Austin American-Statesman was already predicting
that opponents, would turn to the legislature to address their
98
concerns.
Environmentalists will characterize the battle [in the legislature] as
"Austin-bashing", while developers and landowners just outside the
city [who were affected by the S.O.S. ordinance but could not vote]
will say they are trying to stop "the People's Republic of Austin"
from violating their property rights in the name of water-quality
protection. 9 9
Another debate in another arena will likely reveal, once again, the
need for judicial guidance in the field of land-use regulation.
This is why Jeremy Paul recommends a judicial, not legislative,
effort "to defend certain aspects of property as more central to the
idea of constitutional protection," or to provide "increased protection
for selected property rights,"20 0 even though he concedes that "each
196. See generally Charles R. Wise, The Changing Doctrine of Regulatory Taking and
the Executive Branch: Will Takings Impact Analysis Enhance or Damage the Federal Government's Ability to Regulate?, 44 ADMIN. L. REv. 403 (1992).
197. But see Taking Cover, supra note 127, at 33, where Professor Sax stated:
I don't think courts [after Lucas] are going to treat legislatures as if they were
plaintiffs in a lawsuit and make them prove their case by a preponderance of evidence. That ... would significantly undercut the whole notion of deference to legislatures .... I agree the language of [Lucas] suggests a . . .strong judicial movement-toward opening up legislative decisions to questioning. But I would be
astonished if it happens.
However, Justice Blackmun, in his Lucas dissent, argued that the majority's approach places
on the state the "burden of showing the regulation is not a taking." Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2909.
198. See Laylan Copelin, S.O.S. fight may spill over into Legislature, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, August 10, 1992, at Al. The turn to the legislature in response to Austin's
regulatory activities would be a re-turn, as legislation seemingly directed at Austin has been
adopted several times in the last five years.
199. Id.
200. Paul, supra note 140, at 1545; cf. Wise, supra note 196, at 405 ("[It could] be
argued that the President and the executive branch have a constitutional responsibility to es-
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generation must decide for itself . . . which kinds of sacrifice constitute the price of civilization and which sacrifices are themselves uncivilized." ' 1 Richard Epstein, whose views often seem to have little
in common with Paul's, agrees that
[tihere is simply no consensus as to what the basic stratum of property rights is....
And what we have to do therefore is perhaps be
less certain of our ability to organize this system in a comprehensive fashion, and try to figure out modestly and cautiously how we
can make a fair approximation as to what should be the right and
the wrong answers. 202
Just as the adoption of the S.O.S. ordinance in Austin reflected distrust of municipal government, property rights advocates like Epstein recommend a "politics of distrust" toward governments engaged in land-use regulation: "If I really did believe . . . that local
governments . . . had the perfect welfare of the public at heart in
each and every transaction that they initiated, I would be in favor of
2 03
a very weak system of property rights. But I don't believe that.
In Epstein's perspective, governments-subject as they are to influence-need to be constrained in their dealings with private individuals just like individuals are with each other.2 04 The regulatory takings doctrine, for Epstein, provides a supervisory function to ensure
that the government and landowners operate within the same system,
that is, to ensure a balance between public benefits and private
rights.2 5 While this emphasis on private property rights is not uncontroversial,"' one need not become a disciple of Epstein to recognize that a judicial posture of deference to regulators in takings
cases undermines the "substantial advancement" standard.
Perhaps "distrust of regulators", including initiative voters, provides a guiding but indeterminate "intermediate" standard for retablish a regulatory framework that is properly respectful of property rights as embodied in
the Constitution.").
201. Paul, supra note 140, at 1547.
202. See WRC Conference debates environmental takings: remarks of Richard A. Epstein, Private Property and the Politics of Distrust, WASH. RES. COUNCIL NOTEBOOK, Vol. 7,
No. 4, June 1992, at 7 [hereinafter WRC Conference]; see also Lunney, supra note 139, at
1938 ("The early Court's decision to give greater authority to the individual, rather than the
community, reflected not so much a desire to provide greater protection to those with property
as a distrust of the legislative process.") (footnotes omitted).
203. WRC Conference, supra note 202, at 7.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. For a conservative, view of property rights with an acknowledgement of opposing
views and their sources, see Burling, supra note 171, at 322-27.
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view of contemporary land-use regulations. Indeed, the attempt to
capture the notion of "substantial advancement" in the Texas Impact Fee Act, with its complex accounting rules (e.g., segregation of
funds in clearly identified interest-bearing accounts, expenditure
within a prescribed period or refund, etc.),2 0 7 clearly reflected a distrust of local government. Moreover, such efforts indicate the type of
guidance that courts might offer to ensure that a process of justification precedes land-use regulation.
From almost any perspective, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
provided the kind of guidance needed by governmental regulators
and landowners with respect to the regulatory takings doctrine. One
response to this doctrinal inadequacy is to seek legislative solutions,
but majoritarian review of majoritarian excess is-in terms of the
Fifth Amendment-no review at all. Another response is to decry
the adversarial legalism that looks to the judicial process as a
"trump card" in debates over legal entitlements, and to propose cooperation as we balance environmental enhancement with economic
gain.2 08 The motivation to cooperate, however, seems to depend upon
the tension between two justifiable interests, that is, two interests
recognized as legally significant. For example, the incentive for regulatory bodies and owners of large projects to enter into development
agreements is the parties' understanding that there are limitations on
land-use regulation as well as on land use. If the limitations on regulations are perceived to be relaxed, then cooperation is less likely and
landowners will turn to the courts for recognition of property rights.
Whether Nollan and/or Lucas indicate a move toward heightened scrutiny of the purpose and effectiveness of a regulatory
scheme, the tradition of deference to regulators has become a barrier
to judicial reflection on the nature of contemporary property rights.
Those who drafted the S.O.S. initiative relied on the fact that no
serious justification of the purpose and the effectiveness of the ordinance would ever be required. If its purpose is called into question
by identifying its redundant restrictions on impervious cover and
runoff pollution, courts have not uniformly identified "overkill" as a
suspect regulatory category. The responsibility to give meaning to
"substantial advancement" has been evaded, or left to legislatures,
along with the responsibility to help define property rights generally.
In his recent "ruminations" on Lucas, Epstein argued that
See TEx. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 395.024.
208. See John J. Lormon, Adversarial Legalism, ENVIRONMENTAL ADVISOR, Spring
1992, at 1, 3.
207.
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South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act "should be viewed
with suspicion if any attention is paid to [its] statement of
purposes:"2 o9
There are many purposes listed, including preservation of open
spaces, [which] undercuts the proposition that the [Act] was
passed in order to control the risk of hurricane damage .... At the
very least, the constant reiteration of purposes that have nothing to
do with harm prevention should place a heavy burden on South
Carolina to show that this statute falls within the traditional conception of police power 10
Moreover, Epstein observed, a building on Lucas' island lots presents
far less risk of hurricane damage than rebuilding in densely populated areas, like Charleston, thus the "selective nature of building
restriction [on Lucas] speaks volumes about the actual purpose behind the" Act.2 11 Finally, Epstein argues that the "scope of the restriction [on Lucas] is far broader than necessary to achieve its
end[;] ...far more moderate restrictions would do relatively little to
the private value from the use of the land, but would answer virtually all of the concerns with hurricane damage."21' 2 Even if one is not
willing to join Epstein in his recurrent call for "adoption of a regime
for the protection of private property and economic liberties" similar
to "the edifice" protecting freedom of speech,2"' the argument for
intellectual honesty by regulators is appealing. Moreover, no great
departure from Supreme Court aphorisms is needed for courts to require, in takings cases, demonstration of a public need that is effectively advanced, with a minimum intrusion on recognized property
rights.
Another responsibility of the judiciary in takings claims, rarely
explored even when acknowledged, is to identify when a regulation is
"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 2 4 Any
209. See Richard A. Epstein, Ruminations on Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: An Introduction to Amicus Curiae Brief, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1225, 1229 (1992).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1229-30.
212. Id. at 1230. The State could have specified restrictions on size, shape, and materials used in buildings; or required storm cellars; or imposed clean-up costs. Id.
213. Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 UNIV. CHI.
L. REv. 41, 42-43 (1992). Michelman, surely, is not so willing. See Frank I. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constitutional Method, 59 U. Cm.L. REv. 91 (1992) (critical response to Epstein).
214. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), quoted in First English, 482
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attempt to clarify this constitutional prohibition requires some level
of definition beyond "fairness" and "justice."
2.

Spreading Burdens

[Courts hearing takings claims must] consider whether the legislature is seeking to prevent the claimant from acting unjustly or
whether the claimant is being asked to serve
his community in a
2 15
fashion above and beyond the call of duty.
Land-use regulation is typically aimed at new development, but
this can lead, in certain circumstances, to an apparently unfair burden. Even in the absence of a "right to develop" in property law,
identification of a problem such as water runoff pollution followed by
a requirement of less intense new development seems to permit existing runoff pollution. If a mere potential for serious water quality
degradation exists, preventing further development is certainly a solution, but then the cost of preventing serious pollution is borne
solely by the owners of undeveloped land. If courts limited broad
''grandfather" exemptions and required that remedial ordinances,
even severe restrictions, spread the burden among those benefitted
(or, alternatively, if a court adopted this hypothetical as a paradigm
taking for its constitutional analysis), the pressure and cost of local
regulation would be felt by the entire community.
Even though such a rule does not address the strange result in
post-Lucas takings jurisprudence that a total loss results in compensation, while a landowner with 95% loss will get nothing, 1 which
may be an unsolvable puzzle due to both the ambiguity of the term
"loss" and the seeming desire to establish rules even if they do not
make sense,217 the notion of fairness is given an initial baseline. The
Texas Impact Fee Act not only echoed Nollan's "essential nexus"
guidelines, but also confirmed that the burden of remedying an acknowledged harm not directly caused by new development should be
shared by all of the beneficiaries. Such efforts clarify the principle
that a few should not bear the burdens of the many.
U.S. at 318-19. For a thorough analysis of this requirement coupled with an appeal to public
choice theory, see Lunney, supra note 139.
215. Paul, supra note 140, at 1435.
216. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
217. In Lucas, "the Court adopted a categorical rule that prevents inquiry into the rationale for a new regulation if that regulation creates a total loss .... Such a rule is wholly
arbitrary." Jeremy Paul, Scalia's Pursuit of Property's Holy Grail Has Its Price, CONN. L.
TRIB., July 20, 1992, at 2.
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After the Court's opinion in Nollan, Douglas Kmiec pointed out
that "the nexus requirement . . . measures not just the closeness of
the fit between regulatory means and ends but also whether the burden of the regulation is properly placed on this landowner." 18 The
two principles mentioned above-the substantial advancement test
and the placement of burdens on those benefitted-are thus related
in Kmiec's reading of Nollan.219 Recall as well Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennell, where "the neediness of renters" was, in his view,
"not remotely attributable to the particularlandlords that the .[challenged rent-control] ordinance singles out. .... -"o This connection,
between means/end analysis and unfair burdens, is demonstrated by
conceiving the requirement of substantial advancement as calling for
effective regulation. If an ordinance enacted to prevent some social
harm affects only a few, it may be ineffective because only a few
have been burdened by the regulation-in other words, all who contribute to the harm should be targeted. On the other hand, if an
ordinance accomplishes its end but affects only a few, then its propriety is called into question-if the harm is not caused by those few
who are burdened, why should they bear the cost of eliminating the
harm? The S.O.S. ordinance is effective under the first category if
the current level of land use .(together with allowed small development) will not degrade water quality, but new large developments
will; but then the double burden of runoff control and impervious
cover limitations is unjustifiable under a strong reading of the "substantial advancement" test. More likely, the S.O.S. ordinance falls
into the latter category; those burdened by the regulation will not
contribute to the harm-water pollution-to be prevented, and those
who do contribute are exempt.
Professor Lunney recently criticized Supreme Court takings jurisprudence for both its flawed reading of early takings cases and the
"resulting factor test [that] fails to ... prevent the government from
unfairly 'forcing some people alone to bear public burdens.' "1221
Aside from the first critique, Lunney suggests "that the taking-regulation line should depend primarily on differences in effective size
218. Douglas Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1651 (1988).
219. Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988), "the
Nollan nexus requirement clearly is linked, not just to a facile matching of the state's means
or ends, but to whether compensation is required because the end ... places a disproportionate
burden on a landowner." Kmiec, supra note 218, at 1653.
220. 485 U.S. at 21.
221. Lunney, supra note 139, at 1927.
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between the group burdened and the group benefitted when the gov222
ernment shifts or interferes with existing property rights.
Whatever the merit of such an approach, Lunney's reconsideration
of unfair burdens reflects the sort of attention to takings aphorisms
that we propose.
Of course, without a stronger requirement that regulations must
"substantially advance" a legitimate state interest, and a stronger
prohibition against placing a disproportionate burden on certain
landowners, the S.O.S. ordinance is a "run-of-the-mill" land use
regulation.
V.

CONCLUSION

The genesis, campaign for, and ultimate victory of the S.O.S.
ordinance in Austin provides a model for land-use planning when
local government appears unresponsive to popular causes. While the
model may generate envy among environmentalists nationwide, we
sense that an essential part of the land-use planning process-namely, recognition of the regulatory takings doctrine and its
associated principles of property rights-was missing in the Austin
experience. Like many others, we blame the U.S. Supreme Court for
its failure to clarify the takings doctrine, although we are aware of
some who think that clarity in this field is neither possible nor desirable.2 3 We agree with those who appeal to the Court to develop (i)
intermediate principles-not mere generalizations and not a unified
theory that denies the persistence of contradictory visions within
property law-based on a candid recognition of our various models
of property and their weaknesses, and (ii) guiding paradigms of appropriate and inappropriate regulation, to provide some of the miss222. Id. at 1954.
If the Court consistently focused on whether the rights of the very few have been
burdened for the benefit of the many in resolving the compensation issue, then the
very few would not need to organize into a concentrated group and protect themselves in the legislature; they could be certain that they would be compensated.
Furthermore, if society as a whole, rather than the members of the concentrated
group, will bear the expected cost of a given government action, then a dispersed
group, taxpayers, will replace the concentrated group that would otherwise have
opposed the proposed measure. As a result, the compensation requirement can convert a dispersed-concentrated conflict, with its accompanying failure of voice, into a
dispersed-dispersed conflict in which the voices the legislature hears will accurately
reflect . . . the desire of society as a whole.
Id.
223.
(1988).

See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Takings 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1621-29

60

HOFSTRA PROPERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:11

ing guidance-not the missing solution-in takings jurisprudence.
Statutes that require a justification process and provide examples of
unfair regulations offer a model approach for courts facing the takings dilemma.
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APPENDIX

Save Our Springs Initiative Petition
AN ORDINANCE INrrTATED BY PETTnON BY TRE CITr NS OP AUSTIN TO
PREVENT POLLutnoN OF BARTON SPRINGS, BARTON Cm
AND THE BARTON
SPRINGS EDWARDS AQUnEr; RESTRICTING MPEPRVIOUSCOVER;
LmtrING
EXExIPTIONS, VARIANCES,
ETC..;
REDUCING RISKS OF ACCIDENTAL
CONTAMINATION op BARTON SPRINGS AND OTIIER WATER BODIES; REQUIRING
FAIR, CONSISTENT, AND COST EFFECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF AUSTIN'S WATER
QUALITY ORDINANCES; CONTAINING OTHER PovisioNs RELATING TO T E
su$JECTs; AND PROVDmNGAN EFFECTIVE DATE.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF AUSTIN:
PART . DECLARATION OF INTENT: The people of the City of Austin declare their intent to preserve a
clewn and safe drinking water supply, to prevent further degradation of the wier quality in Barton Creek, Barton
Springs, and the Barton Springs Edwards Aquifer, to provide for fair, consistent, and cost-effective a miistration
of the City's watershed protection ordinances, and to promote thepublic health, safety and welfare. The City of
Austin recognizes that the Barton Springs Edwards Aquifer is more vulnerable to pollution from urban
development than any other major groundwater supply in Texas, and that the measures set out in this ordinance
are necessary to protect this irreplaceable natural resource.
PART 2. POLLUTION PREVENTION REQUIRED: (a) In the watersheds contributing to Barton Springs. no
development nor any revision, extension, or amendment thereof, may be approved unless it is designed, carried
out and maintained on a site-by-site basis to meet the pollution prevention requirements set forth below for the life
of the project. In order to prevent pollution, impervious cover for all such development &hall be limited to a
maximum of fifteen (15) percent in the entire recharge zone, twenty (20) percent in the contributing zone within
the Barton Creek watershed, and twenty-five (25) percent in the remainder ofthe contributing zone. The
impervious cover limits shall be calculated on a net site area basis. In addition, runoff from such development
shall be managed through water quality controls and onsite pollution psevention and assimilation techniques so
that no increases occur in the respective average annual loadings of total suspended solids, total phosphorus, total
nitrogen, chemical oxygen demand, biochemical oxygen demand, total lead, cadmium, fecal coliform, fecal
streptococci, volatile organic compounds, total organic carbon, pesticides, and herbicides from the site. For a
given project, impervious cover shall be reduced if needed to assure compliance with these pollutant load
restrictions.
(b) Within the watersheds contributing to Barton Springs, Section 13-7-23 of the Land Development
Code is a ended so that in no event shall the boundary of the critical water quality zone be less
thn 200 feet
from the centerline of a major waterway or be les than 400 feet from the centerline of the main channel of Barton
Creek. No pollution control structure, or residential or commercial building. may be constructed in the critical
water quality zone in these watersheds.
PART 3. NO EXEMPTIONS, SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS, WAIVERS OR VARIANCES: The requirements of
this ordinance are not subject to exemptions, special exceptions, waivers, or variances allowed by Article V of
Chapter 13-2 of the Land Development Code. Adjustments to the application of this ordinance to a specific
project may be granted only as set out in Part 6 below.
PART 4. APPLICATION TO EXISTING TRACTS, PLATTED LOTS, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS: (a) This
ordinance does not apply to development on a single platted lot or a tingle tract of land that is not required to be
platted before development if: (1)the lot or tract existed on November 1, 1991. and (2) the development is either
(i)

construction, renovation, additions to,repair, or development of a single-family attached, or a
duplex structure used exclusively for residential purposes, and construction of improvements incidental
to that residential use; or

(ii)

development of a maximum of 8,000 square feet of impervious cover, including impervious cover
existing before and after the development.
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(b) This ordinance does not apply to development of public primary or secondary educational facilities if the City
and the school district enter into a development agreement approved by a threeuarters vote of the City Council
protecting water quality pursuant to Section 13-2-502(o)(7) of the Land Development Code.
PART 5. EXPIRATION OF PRIOR APPROVALS: Within the watersheds contributing to Barton Springs, the
following provisions shall govern the expiration of certain prior approvals:
A. PREVIOUSLY APPROVED PRELIMINARY SUBDIVISION PLAN:
(a) Unless it has or will have expired sooner, a preliminary subdivision plan initially approved before the effective
date of this ordinance expires one year after the effective date of this ordinance, or two years after its initial
approval, whichever date is later, unless an application for final plat approval is filed before this expiration date
and a final plat is approved no later than 180 days after filing.
(b) No approved preliminary plan, and no portion of an approved preliminary plan, shall bevalid or effective
after the expiration date established by this part, or shall be extended, revised or renewed to remain effective after
the expiration date, except according to subpart C.
B. PREVIOUSLY APPROVED SITE PLAN: (a) Unless it has or will have expired sooner, a site plan
or phase or portion thereof initially approved before the effective date of this ordinance shall expire one year after
the effective date of this ordinance, or three years after its initial approval, whichever date is later, unless:
(1)

an application is filed before this expiration date for building permits for all structures shown on the site
plan or phase or portion thereof and designed for human occupancy, and the building permits are
approved and remain valid and certificates of occupancy are issued no later than two years after this
expiration date; or

(2)

if no building permits are required to construct the structures shown on a site plan described in subpart
(a), construction begins on all buildings shown on the site plan or portion or phase thereof before this
expiration date, and the buildings are diligently constructed and completed, and certificates of compliance
or certificates of occupancy are issued no later than two years after this expiration date.

(b)
No approved site plan, and no separate phase or portion of an approved site plan, shall be valid or
effective after the expiration date established by this part , or shall be extended, revised, or renewed to remain
effective after the expiration date, except according to subpart C.
C. APPROVED PLANS WHICI COMPLY: An approved preliminary subdivision plan, portion of a
preliminary plan, approved site plan, or separate phase or portion of an approved site plan that complies with this
ordinance or that is revised to comply with this ordinance does not expire under subpart A or subpart B and
remains valid for the period otherwise established by law.
PART 6. LIMITED ADJUSTMENT TO RESOLVE POSSIBLE CONFLICTS WITH OTHER LAWS: (a) This
ordinance is not intended to conflict with the United States Constitution or the Texas Constitution or to be
inconsistent with federal or state statutes that may preempt a municipal ordinance or the Austin City Charter.
(b) The terms of this ordinance shall be applied consistently and uniformly. Ifs three-quarters majority
of the City Council concludes, or acourt of competent jurisdiction renders a firal judgment concluding, that this
ordinance, as applied to a specific development project or proposal, violates a law described in subpart (a), then
the City Council may, after apublic hearing, adjust the application of this ordinance to that project to the
minimum extent required to comply with the conflicting law. Any adjustment shall be structured to provide the
maximum protection of water quality.
PART 7. CONSTRUCTION OF ORDINANCE: Tbis ordinance is intended to be cumulative of other City
ordinances. In case of irreconcilable conflict in the application to a specific development proposal between a
provision of this ordinance and any other ordinance, the provision which provides stronger water quality controls
on development shall govern. If sword or term used in this ordinance is defined in the Austin City Code of
1981, as that code was in effect on November 1, 1991. that word or term shall have the meaning established by
the Austin City Code of 1981 in effect on that date, unless modified in this ordinance.
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PART 8. REDUCE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL CONTAMINATION: Within one year of the effective date of
lus ordinance the City of Austin Environmental and Conservation Services Department shall complete a study,
with citizen input, assessing the risk of accidental contamination by toxic or hazardous materials of the Barton
Springs Edwards Aquifer and other streams within the City of Austin and its extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
assessment shall inventory the current and possible future use and transportation of toxic and hazardoua materials
in and through Austin, and shall make recommendations for City actions to reduce the risk of accidental
contamination of the Barton Springs Edwards Aquifer and of other water bodies. Within 60 days of completion
of the study, and following a public hearing, the City Council shall take such actions deemed necessary to
minimize risk of accidental contamination of city waters by hazardous or toxic materials.
PART 9. EFFICIENT AND COST-EFFECTIVE WATER QUALITY PROTECTION MEASURES: In
carrying out City of Austin efforts to reduce or remedy runoff pollution from currently developed areas or to
prevent runoff pollution from currently developed or developing areas, the City Council shall assure that funds for
remedial, retrofit, or runoff pollution prevention measures shall be spent so as to achieve the maximum water
quality benefit, and shall assure that the need for future retrofit is avoided whenever feasible.
PART 10. SEVERABIITXY: If any provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, or phrase of this ordinance.
or the application of the sameto any person, property, or set of circumstances is for any reason held to be
unconstitutional, void, or otherwise invalid, the validity of the remaining portions or this ordinance shall not be
affected by that invalidity; and all provisions of this ordinance ae severable for that purpose.
PART 11.AMENDMENT. CODIFICATION, AND EFFECTIVE DATE: (a) The adoption of this ordinance
is not intended to preclude the adoption, at any time, by a majority vote of the City Council of stricter water
quality requirements upon development in the watersheds contributing to Barton Springs or of further measures to
restore and protect water quality.
(b) If this ordinance is enacted by the Austin City Council under subsection (a) of Section 5.Article IV of the
Austin City Charter, this ordinance shall be effective ten days after the date of its final passage and, subject to
subpart (a) and to controlling law, shall not be repealed or amended by the City Council until two years after its
effective date. Thereafter, this ordinance may be repealed or amended only be an affirmative vote of no less than
six members of the City Council.
(c) The City Council shall codify the provision of this ordinance into appropriately numbered sections of the
Austin City Code without changing the language or effect of this ordinance, except to delete those subparts that do
not apply because of the method in which this ordinance became effective.
PASSED AND APPROVED:

.19-

Bruce Todd
Mayor
ATTEST:

APPROVED:
Iris J.Jones
City Attorney

James E. Aldridge
City Clerk

